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NOTES
DUE PROCESS AND LONG ARM JURISDICTION IN
MINNESOTA: A CRITICISM OF THE MINIMUM
CONTACTS STANDARD
Subject to limitations imposed by constitutionalstandards,state law
determines the conditions under which a nonresident defendant in a
civil action may be subject to a court's jurisdiction. The original due
process standard that prohibitedpersonaljurisdictionover a defendant
located outside the forum state has been retracted and replaced. The
more flexible standardrequiringa defendant to have minimum contacts
with the forum was developed to address the interstate character of
modern transactionsand activity. Since the minimum contacts standard was first articulatedsocial and technological changes have eroded
the capability of the standard to provide an objective assessment of
whether due process requirements have been met. Nevertheless, the
courts rely on the minimum contacts standardto interpretthe scope of
state jurisdictionalstatutes. The purpose of this Note is to suggest a
supplemental standardto the minimum contactsstandardwith the goal
of achievingan objective measure of due process in personaljurisdiction.
First, however, this Note examines the history of due processin personal
jurisdiction.Second, the five-factor test of minimum contacts currently
used in Minnesota and the Minnesota long arm statutes are surveyed.
Additionally, an interpretationof Minnesota's recently amended personal jurisdiction statute is proposed.
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INTRODUCTION

The requirement of due process has limited the bower of states over
nonresident defendants since a century ago when the United States
Supreme Court declared territoriality to be the cornerstone of due process in persQnal jurisdiction.' Under the doctrine of territoriality, a state
could assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if
the defendant was located within the forum's territorial boundaries.'
Subsequent decisions, however, modified the stringent requirements
imposed by this doctrine,3 and today the physical presence of a defendant in a state is less relevant than the nature of the defendant's contacts with the state. Known as the minimum contacts standard, this
modified doctrine of territoriality requires that before a nonresident
defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the defendant must
have had sufficient minimum contacts with the state to satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 5
Prompted by the more flexible requirements of the minimum contacts
standard, state legislatures have enacted personal jurisdiction statutes,'
1. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S, 714 (1877).
2. See id. at 722-23.
3. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 201-05 (1977); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. See, e.g., Ellwein v. Sun-Rise, Inc., 295 Minn. 109, 111, 203 N.W.2d 403, 405 (1972)
(minimum contacts can exist without defendant having been physically present in the
state).
5. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
6. See, e.g., McNeely v. Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 292 F. Supp. 232, 236 (D. Minn.
1968) (Minnesota's corporate long arm statute was enacted in response to McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)); cf. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm:
Eight Years of Extended Jurisdictionin Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 537 (Illinois was

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol5/iss2/1

2

et al.: Due Process and Minnesota Long Arm Jurisdiction: A Criticism of t
19791

MINNESOTA LONG ARM JURISDICTION

referred to as long arm statutes 7 and single act statutes.' Increasingly,
courts have determined that these statutes were intended to apply
within constitutionally permissible limits.' As a result of these broad
interpretations, the due process standard has become incorporated into
state statutes governing personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. ° Due process in personal jurisdiction therefore appears to function in a dual capacity. Incorporated into the statutes, the due process
standard is a basis of statutory authority for a court to exercise jurisdiction." Concurrently, the standard is the constitutional perimeter be2
yond which no statute can authorize jurisdiction over a defendant.
Affecting the validity of the due process standard are both practical
considerations about the effect of jurisdictional rules in a society that
is technologically advanced and philosophical principles affecting the
function of due process." Although the law of personal jurisdiction has
kept pace with social change," the justification for the law has grown
more abstract. 5 Derived from the territoriality doctrine, the minimum
contacts standard is founded on the location of a defendant's activities
first state to enact a comprehensive personal jurisdiction statute under liberalized due
process standard).
7. See, e.g., Anderson v. Luitjens, 311 Minn. 203, 206, 247 N.W.2d 913, 915 (1976). The
phrase "long arm statute" is generic, referring to all types of statutes that describe conduct upon which jurisdiction over a nonresident can be predicated. Cf. Annot., 19
A.L.R.3d 171, 172 (1968) (some long arm statutes are general in nature and others apply
to specialized fields of law). See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 397, 403 (1969).
8. See, e.g., Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 188 (8th Cir. 1965). The
phrase "single act statute" refers to statutes that predicate jurisdiction over a nonresident
on the basis of the nonresident's isolated act or transaction in the forum state. See Annot.,
19 A.L.R.3d, supra note 7, at 171-72. The concept of a single act is difficult to define and
may consist of several individual activities. See Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d, supra note 7, at 402
n.3.
9. See, e.g., Taylor v. Portland Paramount Corp., 383 F.2d 634, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1967).
10. Cf. Thompson v. Keikhaefer, 372 F. Supp. 715, 718 (D. Minn. 1973) (The Minnesota
Supreme Court's decisions "under the [personal jurisdiction] statute basically have
turned on due process grounds, rather than statutory interpretation.").
11. Cf. Taylor v. Portland Paramount Corp., 383 F.2d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 1967) (in
determining the scope of long arm jurisdiction state courts have abdicated their duty to
construe their own statutes, relying instead on the United State Supreme Court's interpretation of due process). See notes 155-65 infra and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
13. See notes 227-37, 259-65 infra and accompanying text.
14. Cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 202 (1977) (advent of increased interstate
activity resulted in modifications to jurisdictional restrictions); Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 260 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting) (increasing ease of communication and transportation will continue to relax standards of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants).
15. Compare Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1877) (no state can exercise jurisdiction over persons located outside its territory) with Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84,
91 (1978) (exercise of jurisdiction depends on existence of sufficient connection between
defendant and forum state to make it fair to require defense in forum).
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in relation to the forum.16 On the basis of this relationship, the fairness
of asserting personal jurisdiction is evaluated, the physical location of
activities being the objective measurement of fair play and substantial
justice." A standard of fairness based on physical activities, however,
is affected by immense changes in the quantity and nature of interstate
transactions that have occurred with the evolution of technology, particularly electronics technology,'" and as technology renders less significant
and less apparent the physical location of transactions, the objective
measure of fair play and substantial justice based on physical location
becomes less useful. Unless fairness is interpreted in terms of measurable factors, a standard of fairness has the propensity to become subjective and elusive.' 9
Questioning whether the law of due process in personal jurisdiction is
expressed adequately by the minimum contacts standard, this Note
suggests that a contemporary theory of due process has not been articulated sufficiently by the courts." To analyze the current law, the nature
and purpose of due process in the law of personal jurisdiction and the
historic context in which the doctrines of territoriality and minimum
contacts have evolved are examined. 2' With regard to Minnesota law,
16. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).
17. See, e.g., id. at 320 (company's "operations" established sufficient contacts); von
Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv.
1121, 1171-73 (1966).

18. See notes 228-30 infra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 235-37 infra and accompanying text.
20. See notes 227-58 infa and accompanying text.
21. See notes 25-107 infra and accompanying text.
The discussion in this Note presumes that the evolution of law is shaped by historical
events in combination with society's perception and description of those events. The
endeavor to describe human experience culminates in "knowledge." Knowledge exists in
a structured form, describable as a "paradigm." Paradigms, systems of knowledge, replace
one another when, over periods of time, human experience leads to a determination that
a particular system of knowledge cannot provide a meaningful or useful answer for a
problem which requires resolution. See generally T.KUHN, 1Hz STRuCURE oF ScMINIFIc
RavoLuTiONS (2d ed. 1970). New paradigms do not necessarily approximate truth to a
greater extent than those they replace; rather, they are more relevant to the problems at
hand. "[SJince no two paradigms leave all the same 'problems unsolved, paradigm debates always involve the question: Which problems is it more significant to have solved?"
Id. at 110. Similarly, the same legal rationale that was suitable to address the social
conditions and conscience of one era may be highly unsuitable to the circumstances and
problems perceived in another era. Because it is derived from past experience, law is
continually in the process of adjusting to changed social conditions. To be responsive to
contemporary conditions in the application of law, the legal community and the courts
need to identify not only the controlling legal theory but the problems that theory was
fashioned to address; then, a determination can be made as to whether those problems
remain significant. To the extent that the problems either have decreased in significance,
or changed, the legal theory should be reformed. Cf. Tenneco, Inc. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 352 F. Supp. 719, 721 (S.D.W. Va. 1973) ("The police power is difficult to define
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the minimum contacts standard in Minnesota is surveyed,22 and the
Minnesota personal jurisdiction and single act statutes are discussed.2
Finally, a supplemental standard to the minimum contacts standard is
proposed with the goal of achieving a less abstract but still flexible
doctrine of due process in personal jurisdiction7A
1. THE CONSTIrUTIONAL STANDARD

A.

Origins of the Doctrine of Territoriality

Imbedded in the present law of due process in personal jurisdiction
are theories and precedent that derive more from European political
theory than from the English common law.2' Continental theorists, particularly the Dutch jurist Huber, had developed a theory of exclusive
jurisdiction in relation to the power a government has over all persons
within its boundaries.2 Introducing the concept of the exclusivity of
sovereign authority, Huber proposed that a sovereignty's laws have force
binding all persons located within but not beyond the territory of a
government." From that political theory, which was developed with
reference to relations among separate and sovereign nations, the American jurist Story2 applied the principles to state sovereignties bound
precisely, because it is extensive, elastic and constantly evolving to meet new and increasing demands for its exercise for the benefit of society and to promote the general welfare."). For an example of the United States Supreme Court's acknowledgement of this
process, see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1977) (although the history of in rem
jurisdiction and the doctrine of territoriality would permit jurisdiction, the Court will not
perpetuate a rule that "supports an ancient form without substantial modem justification").
22. See notes 119-54 infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 166-226 infra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 238-58 infra and accompanying text. This Note does not discuss the issue
of what, if any, relationship should exist between choice of forum and choice of law
questions. For a discussion advocating the relevance of factors that determine choice of
law to those that determine choice of forum, see Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication
versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205 (1958).
25. See Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT.REv. 241,
258. The early English legal history of jurisdiction involved many factors only one of which
was territoriality. See id. at 252-53. Because the reported English cases concerned jurisdictional relationships within the colonial British Empire, they are not useful as precedent
for jurisdictional relationships among states of equal sovereignty. See id. at 253.
The early English concept of jurisdiction, lasting until the fifteenth century, required
that a defendant be in physical custody. See Farrier, Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Corporations, 17 MINN. L. REv. 270, 270 & n.1 (1933).
26. See Hazard, supra note 25, at 258-60.
27. See id. at 259. Huber suggested that, along with the principle of exclusive jurisdiction, sovereignties by comity recognize one another's power. See id.
28. See J. STORy, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONPulc'r OF LAws (1834). Story's influence
upon the American concept of jurisdiction was substantial. See Hazard, supra note 25, at
262 n.77. Hazard commented:
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together in a federal system." In his application, Story more strongly
established the exclusivity of the state's prerogative over activities located within its boundaries than did the original theory."
The transposition of a European political theory into a principle of the
American legal system created tensions in the law of personal jurisdiction. " In contrast to the group of autonomous governments existing in
Europe, the American states are politically interdependent. Because the
theory of exclusive jurisdiction permitted no exercise of authority beyond the state's boundaries, the theory failed to account for the federal
relationship of the states.3 2 Recognized early, this anomaly was ameliorated to some extent by the provision for exceptions3 to the rule against
3
extraterritorial service of process. '
B.
In Pennoyer v. Neff

2

The Pennoyer Standard
the United States Supreme Court considered

It will have to await further study to say to what extent Story's propositions
were influential in the interval between his first edition and the decision in
Pennoyer v. Neff. There is no question, however, that Story influenced Pennoyer
v. Neff itself. The basic organization, the intellectual structure, and much of the
language of Justice Field's opinion is taken straight from Story ....
Id. at 262 (footnote omitted).
29. See Hazard, supra note 25, at 258-60. Hazard wrote:
Story was instrumental in transforming Continental political theory into legal
rules operative in a federal union. The Continental theorists were after all just
that: They were building intellectual constructs for critical enlightment, not
administering the law in its intricate routine. Story, by the force of his prose
and his learning, suggested that Huber's concepts were to be used to decide
concrete cases and were consonant with the law as it stood.
Id. at 260.
30. See id. at 260-61. According to Hazard:
It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of [Story's] embellishments:
1. A mild statement about territorial sovereignty of states is converted into
a rule limiting judicial jurisdiction.
2. The proposition that persons within the territory are subject to jurisdiction is expanded to include property within the jurisdiction.
3. The proposition is advanced that the jurisdiction over persons and property is exclusive, which does not follow necessarily from Huber's propositions.
Id. at 260.
31. See id. at 261-62.
32. Cf. id. at 263-65 (Story's principles fail to present a rationale for determining jurisdiction in a case involving multistate elements).
33. The exceptions discussed in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) were: state power
to require a nonresident forming a partnership or association in the state to appoint an
agent or representative to receive service of process, see id. at 735, state power to determine a citizen's civil status in relation to a nonresident such as in a divorce action, see
id. at 734-35, and state power to regulate corporations chartered by the state. See id. at
735-36.
34. See Hazard, supra note 25, at 272-75.
35. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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whether an Oregon court should be permitted to assert jurisdiction over
a nonresident, who lived in California, in an action in which service of
process was by publication. The Court determined that service of process on nonresidents beyond state boundaries invaded the exclusive
jurisdiction and sovereignty of another state,3" reasoning that an individual citizen's right to due process of law would be violated if one state
invaded the physical boundaries of another state to assert jurisdiction
37
over a person located there.
The Court's logic in Pennoyer was responsive to the social and political context of the year 1877. The separateness of states and the disruption of federal policy had been demonstrated dramatically just a decade
earlier during the Civil War,'3 yet the Constitution required that states
give full faith and credit to valid judgments rendered by the other
states.38 Additionally, the American public had only a general perception of the immense geographic dimension of the country; 0 in the public
36. See id. at 722.
37. See id. at 722, 733.
38. See 2 D. AARON, R. HOFsTADTER & W. MILLER, THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 37-38 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as R. HOFSTADTERJ. For many years the Southern states were divided
from the Northern states, to the degree that "[aJs late as 1880, Edwin L. Godkin, editor
of the influential New York weekly, The Nation, wrote: 'The South, in the structure of
its society, in its manners and social relations, differs nearly as much from the North as
Ireland does, or Hungary, or Turkey.'" Id. at 38. In 1877, when Pennoyer was decided,
10 of the 11 seceding Southern states had been reorganized and readmitted to the Union
for less than a decade. See id. at 21.
39. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, which states:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall
be proved, and the Effect thereof.
Id. See generally Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and the In
PersonamJurisdictionof State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cm.
L. REv. 569, 570-71 (1958).
40. Boorstin, the historian, has written:
Nothing did more to keep the American open to outrageous novelties and happy
accidents than the indefinite arena of his life. . . . Never before had so populous a modern nation lived in so ill-defined a territory. The continent was only
barely explored, yet settlers preceded explorers. Their maps were few and poorly
drawn. Mapped in myth, mountain ranges, rivers, lakes, deserts, all became
figments of optimism or of desperation: an Eden or a Hell-the Great American
Garden or the Great American Desert.
During the first century of national life, Americans lived not at a verge, but
in myriad fuzzy-edged islands. Westward advances were not a line. And American life, like the nation itself, was distinguished by its lack of clear boundaries.
The continent was covered by penumbras, between the known and the unknown, between fact and myth, between present and future, between native and
alien, between good and evil.
They lived on a little-known continent, but they did not know how little they
knew. Yet if they had known more they might have dared less. Their enterprises
were stirred by misinformation, fable, wild hopes, and unjustified certainties.
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consciousness, the territories" separating the western statesCalifornia, Oregon and Nevada-from other states were exotic, vast,
and dangerous.'" Unknown to that era were the speed and ease of
communication and travel provided by future inventions. While the
national policy of expansion and growth encouraged the population to
move and settle the more remote territorial areas, 43 long distance travel
was rigorous and uncommon." A nonresident defendant no longer present in a state could not easily return to the state to participate in
litigation. Furthermore, the habits and customs of life were vastly differ45
ent among the various regions of the country.
Given the historic context of the decision, Pennoyer reasonably refused to permit personal jurisdiction to extend beyond state boundaries.4' The identification of exclusive jurisdiction with due process, howD. BOORSTIN, THE AMEIucANs 221-22 (1965) (emphasis added). Historians have asserted
that the perception of a huge western expanse has affected the national character and
American historical events. See generally id. at 221-74, 325-90; H. COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND 4-8 (1950); D. NOBLE, THE ETERNAL ADAM AND THE NEw WORLD GARDEN (1968);
D. NOBLE, HISTORIANs AGAINST HIsTORY (1965); HENRY N. SMITH, VIRGIN LAND (1950); G.
WIsE, AMEUCAN HisTomcAL EXPLANATIONS 187-209 (1973). Not until between 1867 and
1879 were large areas of the West geographically and geologically surveyed. See D. BOORSTIN, supra, at 242.
41. Ten western states had yet to be admitted to the Union in 1877. See R. HOFSTADTER,
supra note 38, at 695 (North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Washington, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona).
42. See HENRY N. SMITH, supra note 40, at 174-83. See generally D. BOORSTIN, supra
note 40, at 263; R. HOFSTADrER, supra note 38, at 73-74. Native-American tribes controlled
large geographic areas of the West. See D. BOORSTIN, supra, at 264. "In 1880 half the state
of South Dakota was still considered Indian land." Id. See generally id. at 263-64; R.
HOFSTADTER, supra, at 73-75.
43. See, e.g., R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 38, at 87-89. See generally B. HIBBARD, A
HISTORY OF THE PuBLIc LAND POLICIES (1924). "At the end of the Civil War the time came
at last for the realization of the dream of an agrarian utopia in the West on the basis of
the Homestead Act." HENRY N. SMITH, supra note 40, at 174; see id. at 184-86.
44. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
45. See note 38 supra. Out of the spaciousness of the continent, popular heroes arose:
In America ....
space played the role of time. If Americans, in their new
country, could not be separated from their national popular heroes by hundreds
of years, they were in any case separated by hundreds of miles. This sense of
distance was possible as it had not been in smaller, more homogeneous nations.
D. BOORSTIN, supra note 40, at 333. Analysis of popular literature of the nineteenth century
shows the images of the West were undergoing change in the 1870's, see HENRY N. SMITH,
supra note 40, at 102-03, but the Western hero was still an adventurer in a land of
unfriendly Indians and highway robbers. See id. at 95-96, 99. Heroes symbolized the
"glorious victory of civilization over savagery and barbarism," making way forwestern
settlement. See id. at 52-53. See generally id. at 51-111. Thus, the popular fiction of the
nineteenth century establishes a mythical quality about the West.
46. But cf. Hazard, supra note 25, at 271-72 (noting the inconsistencies of the Pennoyer
decision). "Appraised by contemporary critical standards for assessing logic and policy in
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ever, created a rule that, because of increasing interstate activity, was
subject to immediate and ever-enlarging exceptions. 7 While seeking to
achieve just results, the courts sought to adhere to the doctrine of territoriality.'8 Among the theories used to justify jurisdiction were an individual's consent to suit in a state," and, in the case of foreign corporations, either consent or presence in the state." Consent could be actual,
such as a contractual agreement to appear in a particular jurisdiction,5'
or implied on the basis of a nonresident defendant's actions. 52 For example, statutes were upheld that subjected a nonresident motorist to jurisdiction for use of the state's highways.53
With respect to foreign corporations, states enacted statutes, which
the Supreme Court upheld, 54 that required a corporation to appoint an
agent authorized to receive service of process within the state as a prerequisite to the corporation's doing business in the state. 55 These statutes did not establish, however, that a foreign corporation was doing
business in the state whenever the corporation effected consequences
within the state." Determining whether a foreign corporation's activities
constituted "doing business" in a state, so as to subject the corporation
to personal jurisdiction, was difficult. 7 To establish jurisdiction over a
judicial decision, Pennoyer v. Neff arouses dismay and even despair. It is an example par
excellence of what Karl Llewellyn called the Formal Style in juristic reasoning." Id.
(emphasis in original).
47. See Kurland, supra note 39, at 573-74.
48. See generally Culp, Constitutional Problems Arising from Service of Process on
Foreign Corporations, 19 MNN. L. Rv.375, 377-78 (1935).
49. See Kurland, supra note 39, at 575.
50. See id. at 578, 582.
51. See id. at 575.
52. See id.
53. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Ross, The Shifting Basis of
Jurisdiction,17 MINN. L. REv. 146, 157 (1933). However, because no state has the right to
require nonresidents to obtain prior consent for the use of its highways, the consent theory
was a legal fiction. See Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1953).
54. See, e.g., Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115, 130-32 (1915) (test of presence or
consent was whether corporation was "doing business" in state).
55. See Culp, supra note 48, at 378 n.13 (list of general corporation statutes); Farrier,
supra note 25, at 271-73 (rationale supporting requirement of appointing agent for service
of process); Kurland, supra note 39, at 578; Note, Foreign Corporations-Serviceof Process on Soliciting Agent as Constituting Due Process of Law, 6 MINN. L. REv. 309, 311
(1922).
56. Jurisdiction is not valid unless the corporation is doing business in the state, the
agent is appointed to act within the state, and the litigation arises out of corporate
transactions in the state. See St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356, 357 (1882).
57. See Culp, supra note 48, at 375-76 ("The determination of 'doing business' is a
problem of infinite variety and difficulty .... ").For a discussion of the application of
the consent theory to corporations, see Kurland, supra note 39, at 578-82. One additional
difficulty affected theories of jurisdiction over corporations: the law's historic struggle to
define how, when, and where the corporate entity manifested itself. See id. at 577-78 &
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foreign corporation on the basis that it was doing business in the state,
alternative theories of consent, both actual and implied, and presence
were used to satisfy the due process requirements articulated by the
territoriality doctrine .5 Another theory advanced to aid courts in finding
that a corporation was doing business within a state was the
"submission" theory, which asserted that a corporation coming into the
state subjected itself to the reasonable exercise of the state's police
power. 5 Although other theories were advanced, no single theory dominated: in at least one case the United States Supreme Court relied on
three theories to justify the Court's decision.'" Because all of the theories
failed to evoke a doctrine that could accommodate modern patterns of
business activity, 6 the United States Supreme Court fashioned a different theory that has modified, if not subsumed, the original doctrine of
62
territoriality .
C.

The Minimum Contacts Standard

Discarding the unsatisfactory vocabulary of presence and consent, the
Supreme Court, in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,3 modified the
doctrine of territoriality and advanced the minimum contacts standard.
For extraterritorial service of process to be permitted this standard requires that a defendant not physically present in the state must have
"minimum contacts" with the forum to satisfy traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice." Rather than examining the physical locann.51 & 52. "Strange conclusions, in terms of in personam jurisdiction, necessarily
flowed," id. at 578, from early attempts to rationalize how corporate activity could occur
outside the state of incorporation. See id.
Prior to the prevalence of the corporate form of business activity, at least one court
implied that a corporation could only be sued in its state of incorporation. See, e.g.,
McQueen v. Middletown Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. 5 (N.Y. 1819). The consent and presence
theories necessarily evolved with increased use of the corporate form of business activity.
See Kurland, supra, at 578.
58. Compare, e.g., Bank of America v. Whitney Bank, 261 U.S. 171, 173 (1923) (presence) with, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882) (consent). Absent consent by
the foreign corporations to service of process within the jurisdiction, courts either implied
it or, by examining the nature and extent of a corporation's activities in a state, could
establish the corporation's presence in the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bank of America v.
Whitney Bank, 261 U.S. 171, 173 (1923); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 579 (1914). See generally Culp, supra note 48; Kurland, supra note 39, at 578-86.
59. See Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 F. 566, 588-89 (E.D.
Ky. 1922); Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 149-50
(S.D.N.Y. 1915); Culp, supra note 48, at 377; Farrier, supra note 25, at 277.
60. Farrier, supra note 25, at 277 (decision in Minnesota Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140
(1922) based on three theories).
61. See Kurland, supra note 39, at 585-86.
62. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 205, 206 (1977) (Pennoyer rule has
"collapsed"). See generally id. at 198-206.
63. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

64. See id. at 316.
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tion of a defendant in relation to the forum state, the minimum contacts
standard looks to whether a defendant's activities have occurred in the
forum state.15 The sufficiency of contacts to permit jurisdiction depends
on the nature, quality, and circumstances of the contacts." Additionally, the activities conducted in the state are compared to the cause of
action; when the contacts are related directly to the cause of action a
lower threshold of contacts is necessary to satisfy due process than if the
contacts upon which jurisdiction is based are unrelated to the cause of
action. 7 In the latter instance, the defendant must be conducting continuous and substantial activities within the state that justify the exercise of jurisdiction for all causes of action.68
By holding that a state cannot assert jurisdiction over a defendant
who has no "contacts, ties, or relations" with the state," International
Shoe retained vestiges of territoriality as a necessary aspect of satisfying
due process requirements1 0 Implying that common law fairness is not
synonymous with constitutional due process, the Court, in dictum,
stated that the purpose for imposing a due process standard is to achieve
the fair, organized, and effective administration of public policy. 71
Expanding on InternationalShoe's reasoning, the Court in McGee v.
InternationalLife InsuranceCo.72 held that, in a cause of action brought
by a plaintiff beneficiary of an insurance contract, due process permitted assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant insurance company that
had only one insured in the entire state. Because the insurance contract
was delivered in the state, the premiums were mailed from the state,
and the insured was a resident of the state at the time of death, the
Court found that the insurance contract had a substantial connection
with the state. 7 In its decision, the Court recognized that social conditions recommended a less restrictive standard of personal jurisdiction
than had been suitable in the past." Modem transportation and communication made requiring a defendant to defend a suit in the state in
which the defendant had engaged in business activity less burdensome
65. See id.
66. See id. at 318-19.
67. See id. at 317-19 (by implication).
68. See id. (by implication).
69. See id. at 319; cf. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952)
(when cause of action not related to foreign corporation's activities in state, state may,
but is not required to, assert jurisdiction over the corporation).
70. Cf. Kurland, supra note 39, at 623 (Hanson affirmed that "the concept of territorial
limitations on state power is still a vital one").
71. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
72. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
73. See id. at 223. The contacts in McGee were established through communication by
mail. See id.
74. See id. at 222-23.
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than such a requirement would have been in the Pennoyer era.75 Accord76
ingly, inconvenience was not tantamount to a denial of due process.
Furthermore, the Court found a strong state interest in providing a
forum for settling disputes between resident insureds and nonresident
insurers, particularly because policy holders with small or moderate
claims would be unlikely to follow insurers out of the state to litigate
claims."
In contrast to the expansion of the minimum contacts standard in
McGee, the Court a year later imposed a limitation on the minimum
contacts doctrine in Hanson v. Denckla.7 s The central tension in Hanson
was the correlating of fair play and substantial justice with the doctrine
of territoriality.79 In an opinion that is often criticized for its opaqueness,"0 the majority enunciated a standard of purposeful contacts but
did not examine the justification for the territoriality doctrine." This
failure to reevaluate the territoriality doctrine can be rationalized because the decision was written in an era of less nationalized economic
and social activity than we know today."2
Dora Donner, the decedent in Hanson, had established a trust in
Delaware while still a resident of Pennsylvania. Prior to her death, she
changed her residence to Florida where she both executed a will and
made an intervivos appointment from the Delaware trust to each of two
other trusts established by a daughter, Elizabeth Hanson, for the bene75.
76.
77.
78.

See
See
See
357

id. at 223.
id. at 224.
id. at 223.
U.S. 235 (1958).

79. See id. at 250-51.

80. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 25, at 244 ("In a 5 to 4 decision, Mr. Chief Justice
Warren reached the fair result, . . . but by a line of analysis that in all charity and after
mature reflection is impossible to follow, no less to relate."); Twerski, A Return to Jurisdictional Due Process-The Case for the Vanishing Defendant, 8 DuQ. U.L. Rav. 220, 240
(1970) ("Hanson v. Denckla ...

was so badly mishandled ...

that one is skittish about

drawing meaningful conclusions from the case."); cf. Kurland, supra note 39, at 621-22
(criticizing the Court's attempt to distinguish Hanson v. Denckla from McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.).
81. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-53 (1958). The Court, however, did
acknowledge that changed social conditions had warranted the evolution toward the flexible minimum contacts standard and away from the Pennoyer rule. See id. at 250-51.
82. In the twenty-one years since Hanson changes have come that more closely bind
the opposite ends of the country. Notably, in 1958, practical computer applications were
in their infancy; for example, in the late 1950's the airlines only were beginning to install
limited automatic-reservation systems. See K. STEHLING, COMPUTERS AND You 80-82
(1972). Not until 1963 did the New York Stock Exchange implement computer operations.
See id. at 198. Telecommunications systems via satellite did not exist. Not yet developed
was the program, even now only partially implemented, of electronic transfers of funds.
Some theories have suggested that the onset of the electronic era is affecting drastically
social attitudes and perceptions. See generally M. McLuHAN, THE GUTENBERG GALAXY
(1962).
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fit of Hanson's two sons. After Donner died, two other daughters, Katherine Denckla and Dorothy Stewart, who had each received a half million dollars under the will, challenged the validity of the intervivos
appointments to the two trusts in favor of the two children of Hanson.
Two lawsuits resulted, one in Florida and one in Delaware. Asserting
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the trust," the Florida courts
ruled in favor of the two daughters contesting the appointment. The
Delaware courts, however, found the trust and power of appointment
valid under Delaware law s' and ruled in favor of Hanson's sons. 8
Permitting the Delaware decision to prevail,87 the United States Supreme Court found insufficient contacts between the trustee and Florida
to justify Florida's assertion of jurisdiction.' Although the decedent had
maintained close business relations through the mail with the trustee
for eight years, 9 the Court stated that the cause of action did not arise
"out of an act done or transaction consummated in the forum state"; 0
the trustee had neither solicited business in Florida nor held or administered trust assets there." Any contacts between the trustee and Florida
occurred as a consequence of the decedent's relocation to Florida from
Pennsylvania rather than because the trustee sought out the decedent
in Florida. Such a contact was held to fail to satisfy due process requirements 2 because it did not constitute an "act by which the defendant
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.""
The Court contrasted the fact that the trustee in Hanson had not initiated the contacts with a Florida resident against the fact in McGee that
had solicited a reinsurance agreement with
the nonresident defendant
94
a California resident.
83. Whether the state asserted jurisdiction over the trustee or the trust assets was
unclear. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 243 (1958). For a detailed discussion of the
facts along with a procedural history of the case, see Kurland, supra note 39, at 610-14.
84. See Kurland, supra note 39, at 613-14 (Florida Supreme Court upheld trial court's
determination that power of appointment was an invalid testamentary disposition).
85. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 242.
86. See Lewis v. Hanson, 36 Del. Ch. 235, 128 A.2d 819 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff'g sub nom.
Hanson v. Wilmington Trust Co., 35 Del. Ch. 411, 119 A.2d 901 (1955).
87. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 255. By its decision the Court "reached the fair
result." Hazard, supra note 25, at 244.
88. See id. at 251.
89. "[The corporate trustee] chose to maintain business relations with Mrs. Donner
.. in [Florida] for eight years, regularly communicating with her with respect to the
business of the trust including the very appointment in question." Id. at 259 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
90. Id. at 251.

91. See id.
92. See id. at 253-54 ("unilateral activity" of those claiming relationship with nonresident defendant is insufficient contact).
93. Id. at 253.

94. See id. at 251.
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For a period of eight years, however, the trustee in Hanson did have
continuing business relations with Mrs. Donner in the state of Florida.9 5
Within the context of these facts, the majority opinion's threshold for
purposeful contacts seems to require that the defendant would have had
to effect in some way, rather than acquiesce in, relocation of an ongoing
transaction to another forum. If this assumption is correct, the Hanson
standard may have failed to anticipate the future in the type and
amount of activities that routinely overlap state boundaries." Apparently the Court was attempting to prevent a contact, in and of itself,
from subjecting a nonresident defendant to personal jurisdiction without other contacts with the state.97 According to the Court such unfettered jurisdiction would remove all constitutional restraints against subjecting defendants to suits in foreign jurisdictions. 9
The Court's decision in Hanson reflects the fact that a major difficulty
in devising a standard governing extraterritorial personal jurisdiction is
to develop a conceptual system that neither automatically confers nor
denies jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.9 Perhaps the Hanson
decision sought to avoid such a result by creating a bias in favor of the
party taking a passive role in introducing an additional forum to an
ongoing transaction.9 9 The dissent in Hanson, however, asserted that
the majority was mistakenly basing its rule on conditions that no longer
existed-the predominantly local business affairs and unacceptable
costs and dangers inherent in travel between states existing at the time
of the Pennoyer decision. 1 The dissent would not have required that
contacts be purposeful, or so directly a source of the cause of action.9 2
Subsequent to Hanson, the United States Supreme Court has not
sharpened the distinction between purposeful and nonpurposeful contacts. Not until 1978 did the Court again overrule a state's assertion of
95. See id. at 259 (Black, J., dissenting).
96. See note 82 supra.
97. The Court noted that none of the trust assets had been held or administered in
Florida, and that the trustees had never solicited business, even by mail, in Florida. See
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 251. Furthermore, the cause of action did not arise out of
the trustees' contact with Florida, but was merely related to the contact. See id at 25152. See generally Comment, Minimum Contacts Confused and Reconfused-Variationon
a Theme by International Shoe-Or, Is This Trip Necessary?, 7 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 304,
309 (1970) (relation between contact and cause of action is one element required by due
process).
98. See Hanson ,. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 251. The Court in Hanson stated "it is a mistake
to assume that this trend [toward a more flexible standard] heralds the eventual demise
of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of the state courts." Id.
99. See Twerski, supra note 80, at 241-43.
100. Cf. Currie, supra note 6, at 549 (Hanson requires defendant to have taken
"voluntary action calculated to have an effect in the forum State.").
101. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 259-60 (Black, J., dissenting).
102. See id. at 260.
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extraterritorial personal jurisdiction. 3 The major innovation affecting
the minimum contacts standard has been the Court's enlargement of
the scope of the standard's application to quasi in rem jurisdiction. 0'
Because the standard must be satisfied for a court to obtain jurisdiction
over the interests of a person as well as over the person,0 5 property
103. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). In Kulko, a divorced mother lived
in California and the father lived in New York, where the couple had entered into a
separation agreement. The couple's two children lived in New York with their father and
spent their vacations with their mother in California, pursuant to the terms of a custody
agreement. Subsequently, the children determined that they wanted to live with their
mother in California and the father did not object. In California, the mother petitioned
to increase ,the amount of child support she received. The California Supreme Court
upheld a lower court 's application of the state's long arm statute to the father in the child
support proceeding. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 586 (1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
The California Supreme Court had determined that by allowing his children to live in
California, the father had invoked the benefits and protections of the laws of the state,
deriving an economic benefit by sending his children to live in the state. See 19 Cal. 3d
at 524, 564 P.2d at 358, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 591. The factual basis for this conclusion was
the father's purchase of a plane ticket for his daughter and his consent when she requested
to move. See id. at 524, 564 P.2d at 358, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 590-91. Distinguishing the
father's affirmative acts and consent regarding the custody of his daughter from his lack
of participation in the son's relocation (the mother had paid the son's transportation), the
California court held that, in the case of the son alone, the father's failure to undertake
efforts to retrieve the child would not constitute an invocation of the benefits and protections of the state laws. See id. at 525, 564 P.2d at 358, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 591. The California
court concluded, however, that the state had jurisdiction over the father on the issue of
child support for both children. See id. at 525, 564 P.2d at 358-59, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 59192.
Rejecting the state court's reasoning, the United States Supreme Court held that to
permit the assertion of jurisdiction over the father was unreasonable. See 436 U.S. at 92,
96. Placing importance both on the fact that the case involved domestic relations rather
than commercial activity, see id. at 97, and the fact that the father had remained in New
York where the family had resided, see id., the Court concluded that basic considerations
of fairness would not permit the assertion of jurisdiction over the father. See id. (place of
father's domicile is proper forum).
In summary, the bare fact of a child's residency in a state, although it creates a substantial state interest in protecting the needs of the child, see id. at 98, is not sufficient to
impose an unreasonable burden on family relations when contacts between the state and
the individual do not satisfy the minimum contacts test. See id. at 97-98.
104. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
105. See id. In Shaffer, nonresident plaintiffs sought to bring a shareholder's derivative
suit against officers and directors of a corporation by attaching stock located in Delaware
and owned by the individual nonresident defendants. A Delaware statute established
Delaware as the situs of ownership of stock in Delaware corporations even if the stock
certificates were located in other states. See Di. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1974). The
defendants asserted that they did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the state to
warrant the assertion of jurisdiction over them. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 193.
The lower Delaware court distinguished the facts in Shaffer from those in Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) and its progeny, by asserting that the purpose of
the Delaware statute was to compel the appearance of the defendants rather than to secure
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wholly unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action does not alone provide
a valid basis for state court jurisdiction. 06 Remaining intact is the basic
tenet of the minimum contacts standard as presented in International
Shoe that the relationship between the forum, the defendant, and the
litigation must satisfy the standard of fairness and substantial justice.'1
D.

ConstitutionalRestrictions on the Minimum Contacts Standard

Because the minimum contacts standard has increased the extraterritorial reach of state jurisdiction, the standard may be subject to independent constitutional restrictions. Already recognized by courts' and
commentators as potential restrictions on the minimum contacts standard are the interstate commerce clause' 8 and the first amendment. 09
possession of property pending trial between debtor and creditor. See Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. at 193.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the action was a quasi in rem action
and therefore not subject to the InternationalShoe requirements. See Greyhound Corp.
v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (Del. 1976), rev'd sub nom., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977). The United States Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, further recanting
the doctrine of territoriality:
There have . . . been intimations that the collapse of the in personam wing of
Pennoyer has not left that decision unweakened as a foundation for in rem
jurisdiction. Well-reasoned lower court opinions have questioned the proposition
that the presence of property in a State gives that State jurisdiction to adjudicate rights to the property regardless of the relationship of the underlying dispute and the property owner to the forum. . . . The overwhelming majority of
commentators have also rejected Pennoyer's premise that a proceeding
"against" property is not a proceeding against the owners of that property.
Accordingly, they urge that the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice" that govern a State's power to adjudicate in personam should also
govern its power to adjudicate personal rights to property located in the State.
433 U.S. at 205 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Acknowledging that the state
often has a substantial interest in governing property within its boundaries, the Court held
that many, if not most, types of in rem actions would not be prevented by the application
of the minimum contacts standard. See id. at 207-08. The Court was united in expanding
the scope of the minimum contacts standard, see id. at 219, but the dissent took issue
with the determination that insufficient minimum contacts existed. See id. at 221-22
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In Shaffer, the Court arguably seeks to achieve the fair and orderly administration of
the law by balancing fairness to nonresident defendants and the state's ability to regulate
property within its boundaries. See id. at 207-10.
106. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 211-12.
107. See id. at 204, 206.
108. See, e.g., Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539, 548 & n.9 (D. Minn. 1964)
(dictum) (although no one has sufficiently examined possible adverse effects on interstate
commerce, with expanding concepts of jurisdiction, burden on interstate commerce could
become a factor) (citing Note, Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction,73
HARV. L. REv. 909, 983-87 (1960)). If Congress, through legislation, has authorized a state
to enact laws that burden interstate commerce, no defense based on the interstate commerce clause exists against the state's exercise of personal jurisdiction to enforce those
laws. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945).
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Prior to InternationalShoe the commerce clause did serve as an independent basis upon which to restrict personal jurisdiction that created
an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce." 0 Arguably, the flow
of interstate commerce generally is facilitated more than hindered by
long arm jurisdiction; by availing a means of redress to residents against
nonresident defendants, long arm jurisdiction encourages residents to
conduct business with nonresidents. The courts since InternationalShoe
have suggested, however, that the interstate commerce clause could
limit long arm jurisdiction that was demonstrably harmful to interstate
commerce."'
With regard to the first amendment, the cases suggest two generalizations. First, the first amendment does not create an absolute exclusion
from personal jurisdiction for nonresident publishers."2 Second, first
amendment considerations materially affect the issue of personal jurisdiction."' Recognizing the potential for personal jurisdiction over nonresident publishers to cause a chilling effect on freedom of speech and
the press, one court has held that the first amendment requires a higher
threshold of minimum contacts in a libel case than for other tort cases
in order to avoid creating a chilling effect on the circulation of information."'
In first amendment cases another basis that has been both asserted
to restrict personal jurisdiction over nonresident publishers and criticized is the combination of the minimum contacts standard with the
single-publication rule."' Potentially, the single-publication rule re109. See, e.g., Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 183-84 (2d Cir. 1967);
New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1966); Carrington & Martin,
Substantive Interests and the Jurisdictionof State Courts, 66 MIcH. L. Rlv. 227, 240-42
(1967); Comment, Long-Arm JurisdictionOver Publishers:To Chill a Mocking Word, 67
COLUM. L. Rav. 342, 342 (1967).
110. See, e.g., International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511, 517-18
(1934) (dictum) (necessities of commerce are a basis of denying jurisdiction); Davis v.
Farmers Coop. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 315-16 (1923) (corporate long arm statute imposed heavy and serious burden upon interstate commerce). Theoretically, the interstate
commerce clause could have precluded advancement of the "consent" theory of jurisdiction. See Kurland, supra note 39, at 581.
111. See, e.g., Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th
Cir. 1956). But cf. Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539, 548 & n.9 (D. Minn. 1964)
(dictum) (commerce clause issues have not been sufficiently articulated to assume that
commerce clause should require a separate test of state statute's constitutionality).
112. See, e.g., Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 183-84 (2d Cir. 1967)
("[Tihe First Amendment could be regarded as giving forum non conveniens special
dimensions and constitutional stature in actions for defamation against publishers and
broadcasters.").
113. See id.; New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572-73 (5th Cir. 1966).
114. See New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1966).
115. Compare Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 273 F.2d 166, 171 (7th Cir.
1959) (subsequent distributions after first publication do not create new cause of action),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1960) with Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 179-
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stricts the number of locations in which a libel can occur, because under
the rule each individual sale within a state does not constitute a separate publication."' Following the logic that for purposes of personal
jurisdiction the tort is not completed until an injury results,"' however,
the single-publication rule is irrelevant because an injury can establish
in and of itself a contact with the state."' If the first amendment imposes some restriction on the minimum contacts standard, that restriction, arguably, should stem directly from the first amendment rather
than indirectly from first amendment policy considerations.
E. The Minimum Contacts Standard in Minnesota: The Five-Factor
Test
Using the minimum contacts standard set forth by the United States
Supreme Court, state and federal courts in Minnesota have employed
five factors to examine the constitutionality of an exercise of personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants." 9 First articulated by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co.,25
the five-factor test appears to balance the countervailing policies, on the
one hand, of effective state control of activities affecting state residents,
against, on the other hand, unreasonable assertions of jurisdiction over
nonresidents.' From the United States Supreme Court decisions, the
80 (2d Cir. 1967) (single-publication rule should not be basis of prohibiting lawsuit at place
where effect of publication is felt). The Buckley court's decision that the singlepublication rule does not preclude long arm jurisdiction applies only to plaintiffs who are
generally known or reside in the state in which the alleged libel had occurred. See id. at
180.
116. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Minnesota State Medical Ass'n Foundation, 264
N.W.2d 152, 155 (Minn. 1978). See generally Comment, supra note 109, at 348 & nn.4347.
117. See, e.g., Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enterprises, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1366, 1370
(M.D.N.C. 1973) (place of wrong is location of last event necessary to render actor liable
in tort); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 435-36,
176 N.E.2d 761, 762-63 (1961) (concept of injury inseparable from statute's "tortious act"
phrase).
118. Cf. Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 1967) (the alleged
injury constitutes tortious conduct within the contemplation of the state long arm statute). See also Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d 316, 320-23 (10th Cir.) (discussion
of rationale for not using single-publication rule to prevent exercise of long arm jurisdiction under state statute), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 911 (1977).
119. See, e.g., Anderson v. Luitjens, 311 Minn. 203, 207-08, 247 N.W.2d 913, 916 (1976).
120. 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965).
121. See id. at 195-96 (analyzing five Supreme Court opinions). The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has adopted a three-step analysis that determines first, whether, directly
or indirectly, a nonresident has done an act or completed a transaction in the state,
second, whether the claim arises out of or results from the defendant's activity in the
forum, and third, whether jurisdiction over the defendant rests upon the due process
concepts of fairness and justice. See, e.g., L.D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Indus., Inc.,
265 F.2d 768, 773 & n.12 (9th Cir. 1959).
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Eighth Circuit extracted the following factors to be used in determining
whether jurisdiction should be exercised: (1) the quantity of contacts the
defendant has with the forum, (2) the quality and nature of the contacts,
(3) the source and connection of those contacts with the cause of action,
(4) the state's interest in providing a forum, and (5) the convenience to
the parties. 2 2 By applying these factors to the elements of a particular
case, a court determines whether personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant can be asserted while preserving notions of fair play and
substantial justice. Although none of the factors in the five-factor test
employs the purposeful contacts language set forth in Hanson, and the
test is potentially less restrictive than the language of the purposeful
contacts standard, the five-factor test can be used to articulate the
Hanson standard.'23 By examining the quality, nature, and source of the
contacts, a court can ascertain if the contacts were purposeful enough
to invoke the benefits and protections of the state-the threshold of fair
2
play and substantial justice. '
1.

Quantity

In determining whether the quantity of contacts is sufficient, courts
examine contacts between the defendant and the state that are both
related and unrelated to the cause of action.2 5 A limited number of
related contacts can satisfy due process requirements, 16 and, under
some circumstances, one related contact can be sufficient.'" Absent a
122. See Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965).
123. The Hanson standard is an element of the nature and quality factor. See, e.g.,
Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 295-96 (Minn. 1978); Northern States
Pump & Supply Co. v. Baumann, 311 Minn. 368, 374, 249 N.W.2d 182, 186 (1976);
Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 296, 240 N.W.2d 814, 817-18 (1976).
124. In Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1978), the Minnesota
Supreme Court expressly discussed purposeful contacts in the context of single and isolated transactions. See id. at 295-97.
125. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. White, 420 F. Supp. 1331, 1334-35 (D. Minn. 1976);
American Pollution Prevention Co. v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 304
Minn. 191, 195, 230 N.W.2d 63, 66, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 894 (1975).
126. See, e.g., Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965).
127. See, e.g., Independent School Dist. No. 454 v. Marshall & Stevens Co., 337 F.
Supp. 1278, 1283 & nn.4 & 6 (D. Minn. 1971); Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d
290, 295 (Minn. 1978). When the defendant's single act does not involve direct entry or
contact, such as a physical visit, letter, or phone call, a sufficient contact may be effected
by the signing of a contract with a resident of the forum if any part of the contract is
performed in the state, see, e.g., Independent School Dist. No. 454 v. Marshall & Stevens
Co., 337 F. Supp. at 1283; Kornfuehrer v. Philadelphia Bindery, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 157,
160-62 (D. Minn. 1965), or the occurrence of an injury inside the state from a product
placed in the stream of commerce outside the state. See, e.g., Independent School Dist.
No. 454 v. Marshall & Stevens Co., 337 F. Supp. at 1283; Williams v. Connolly, 227 F.
Supp. 539, 544-50 (D. Minn. 1964); Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp.,
267 Minn. 56, 61-62, 124 N.W.2d 824, 826-27 (1963).
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sufficient number of related contacts, if the contacts unrelated to the
cause of action are sufficiently continuous, assertion of jurisdiction over
the defendant may be justified.' Thus, when the unrelated contacts
amount to an ongoing presence in the state, the quantity factor seemingly will be controlling and the other factors need not be met. Due
process requires at the minimum one contact: meeting that threshold
then permits examination of other factors that affect the sufficiency of
the contact.'
2.

Quality and Nature

The quality and nature of a contact, the second factor, is examined
by describing the contact with the state and determining the potential
effect of the contact in the state. Thus, the quality is greater when the
nature of the contact has the potential to cause physical harm' or when
the contact incurs the benefits and protections of the state's laws for the
defendant.'2 ' The more regularly a defendant transacts business in the
state, the greater the quality and nature of his or her contacts.'32 Even
with as minimal a quantity of contacts as one, the fact of a strong state
interest in providing a forum to residents increases the quality factor.z3
128. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). The
substantial and continuous contacts test for contacts unrelated to the cause of action
includes general business contacts with the forum. See, e.g., Independent School Dist. No.
454 v. Marshall & Stevens Co., 337 F. Supp. 1278, 1284-87 (D. Minn. 1971) (independent
business contacts not sufficiently systematic and continuous to warrant jurisdiction);
American Pollution Prevention Co. v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 304
Minn. 191, 195, 230 N.W.2d 63, 66 (substantial and continuing general business contacts
held sufficient to invoke jurisdiction), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 894 (1975).
129. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957) (one
contact sufficient when state has "manifest interest in providing . . . redress for its
citizens" and "inconvenience to the insurer [is] nothing which amounts to a denial of
due process"); Northern States Pump & Supply Co. v. Baumann, 311 Minn. 368, 372, 249
N.W.2d 182, 185 (1976) ("[Cjompliance with due process cannot be measured mechanically by counting contacts.").
130. See, e.g., Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965) (potential of metal baler to cause harm created element of quality).
131. See, e.g., American Pollution Prevention Co. v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating &
Milling Co., 304 Minn. 191, 195, 230 N.W.2d 63, 66 (defendant took advantage of Minnesota law and could reasonably anticipate economic and legal consequences of its actions
in the state), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 894 (1975); Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn.
77, 111-12, 172 N.W.2d 292, 312 (1969) (parties relying on Minnesota contract law to
uphold terms of agreements may be required to defend actions in the state), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1010 (1970).
132. See, e.g., Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 295-98, 240 N.W.2d
814, 817-18 (1976); American Pollution Prevention Co. v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating &
Milling Co., 304 Minn. 191, 195, 230 N.W.2d 63, 66, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 894 (1975).
133. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (single contact
was insurance contract received in forum state; forum has "manifest interest" in providing
redress for residents when insurers refuse to pay claims).
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The nonresident defendant's role in effecting with the state a contact
related to the cause of action also is significant."' For example, a nonresident defendant is less susceptible to jurisdiction when the plaintiff
solicited the defendant's contact with the state,'35 or when a third-party
defendant's contacts were indirect, 3 ' resulting for example from a relationship with the third-party nonresident plaintiff who is seeking to
invoke jurisdiction.'37 Thus, the quality and nature factor can be described as an evaluation of the bare fact of the contact in relation to its
consequences in the state. This evaluation is affected by the context of
the contact in relation to the facts of the case. 3R
-3. Source and Connection of Contacts with the Cause of Action
The third factor, the source and connection of the contacts with the
cause of action, analyzes the relationship that exists between the con134. See, e.g., B & J Mfg. Co. v. Solar Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 594, 598 (8th Cir. 1973)
(defendant's voluntary instate business transactions led to plaintiff's summary judgment
action to declare defendant's patent invalid), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974).
135. See, e.g., McQuay, Inc. v. Samuel Schlosberg, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 902, 906-07 (D.
Minn. 1971); Northern States Pump & Supply Co. v. Baumann, 311 Minn. 368, 374, 249
N.W.2d 182, 186 (1976) (by implication); Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson
Indus., Inc., 264 Minn. 110, 117-18, 117 N.W.2d 732, 735-36 (1962).
The courts have imposed a lower threshold of contacts to permit jurisdiction over
nonresident sellers than nonresident buyers. See, e.g., Guardian Packaging Corp. v.
Kapak Indus., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 952, 954-55 (D. Minn. 1970); Fourth Northwestern Nat'l
Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 Minn. at 115-16, 117 N.W.2d at 735. This distinction is
not based on the identity of the parties, but, rather, on the difference in the quality and
nature of their contacts with a state. See, e.g., Northern States Pump & Supply Co. v.
Baumann, 311 Minn. at 371-72, 249 N.W.2d at 185. Nonresident sellers who solicit and
initiate transactions in one state and then return to their own state to bring suit on the
accounts of nonresident buyers would gain an unfair advantage over those buyers. See
Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 Minn. at 117, 117 N.W.2d at
736 (quoting and endorsing Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 255, 342 P.2d 871, 875
(1959)). Payments by a defendant in the forum state without any other contacts do not
constitute a minimum contact. See, e.g., Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson
Indus., Inc., 264 Minn. at 118, 117 N.W.2d at 736.
136. See, e.g., Independent School Dist. No. 454 v. Marshall & Stevens Co., 337 F.
Supp. 1278, 1284 (D. Minn. 1971) (third-party defendant's contacts with defendant all
occurred outside Minnesota).
137. See, e.g., id. at 1283. In Marshall & Stevens Co., the plaintiff sued the defendant
insurer for underinsuring a school facility. Denying liability, the nonresident insurer filed
a third-party complaint against the Chicago actuarial company that had computed the
value of the facility. The court refused to extend jurisdiction over the third-party defendant, noting that of the eight alleged contacts with Minnesota, only one had a connection
with the cause of action. See id. at 1283, 1286. Of the single Minnesota contact with the
cause of action, the court stated that it was "extremely tenuous . . . and . . . clearly
insufficient to support an exercise of jurisdiction over [the third-party defendant]." Id.
at 1284.
138. See, e.g., Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 297 (Minn. 1978).
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tacts with the state and the cause of action.13 9 To establish an adequate
source and connection, the contact need not be a direct cause of the
litigation.'4 0 If the consequences in the state from an out-of-state act
that is at issue in the litigation were foreseeable, this factor is satisfied.,
The source and connection need not be established, however, if with
respect to the quantity and quality and nature factors the contacts are
substantial."'
4. State Interest
Articulated as the forum's interest that state residents have a means
of redress,4 3 the state interest factor can tip the balance to permit jurisdiction; when claims are of a nature that their pursuit out of state would
be improbable the state interest is particularly strong.' When claims
relate to issues between nonresidents regarding transactions outside the
state, the state interest is negligible.4 5 As an independent factor, the
state interest factor, along with the convenience factor, is secondary in
importance to the first three factors discussed above.'" This factor,
however, often affects the quality and nature factor. '
139. See, e.g., Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965); Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 298, 240 N.W.2d 814, 819 (1976).
140. See, e.g., Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 298, 240 N.W.2d 814,
819 (1976) (fact that "cause of action arises at least in part out of defendants' contacts
with the state . . .argues in favor of jurisdiction"); cf. Thompson v. Kiekhaefer, 372 F.
Supp. 715, 720 (D. Minn. 1973) (dictum) (in libel action based on letter written and
received out of state, contact may have been sufficient if defendant had made visit to
Minnesota in connection with letter). But see S.S. Kresge Co. v. Kamei-Autokomfort, 363
F. Supp. 257, 261 (D. Minn. 1973) (insufficient that cause of action arises wherever parties
compete; cause of action should arise uniquely out of contact with Minnesota).
141. See, e.g., Anderson v. Luitjens, 311 Minn. 203, 208-09, 247 N.W.2d 913,916 (1976).
142. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945); Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 298, 240 N.W.2d 814, 819 (1976) (when
contacts are substantial with respect to quantity and quality, it is not essential that they
be related to the cause of action).
143. See, e.g., Mid-Continent Freight Lines, Inc. v. Highway Trailer Indus., Inc., 291
Minn. 251, 256, 190 N.W.2d 670, 674 (1971).
144. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (residents
would be at disadvantage if forced to follow insurance company to distant state); Northern
States Pump & Supply Co. v. Baumann, 311 Minn. 368, 374, 249 N.W.2d 182, 186 (1976)
(Minnesota "has an interest in providing a forum for a resident allegedly wronged"); MidContinent Freight Lines, Inc. v. Highway Trailer Indus., Inc., 291 Minn. 251, 255-56, 190
N.W.2d 670, 674 (1971) (jurisdiction over nonresident third-party defendant in indemnity
action by nonresident defendant denied; court would have permitted jurisdiction if plaintiff had commenced suit, against third-party defendant).
145. See, e.g., Independent School Dist. No. 454 v. Marshall & Stevens Co., 337 F.
Supp. 1278, 1288 (D. Minn. 1971). But cf. Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888, 889 (Minn.
1978) (garnishment summons issued; parties were nonresidents at time injury occurred
outside Minnesota), prob. juris. noted, 47 U.SL.W. 3553 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1979) (No. 78952).
146. See, e.g., Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 295 (Minn. 1978).
147. See note 133 supra and accompanying text.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol5/iss2/1

22

et al.: Due Process and Minnesota Long Arm Jurisdiction: A Criticism of t
1979]

MINNESOTA LONG ARM JURISDICTION

5.

Convenience

The final consideration, the convenience factor, balances the interests
of the plaintiff in having the case tried in the particular forum against
the inconvenience to the nonresident defendant for having to defend in
the plaintiff's forum.'4 8 Generally, convenience is measured in relation
to the travel involved in the litigation"' and the location of evidence and
witnesses. 50 Unless the inconvenience to either party is serious, this
consideration is irrelevant. 5 '
As mentioned previously, of the five factors that analyze the character
of the contacts, three are of primary significance. 5 These factors-the
quantity, quality and nature, and source and connection of the contact
to the cause of action-are closely interrelated and have not always been
discussed by the courts separately from one another. 53 Cumulatively,
148. See, e.g., Anderson v. Luitjens, 311 Minn. 203, 210 & n.7, 247 N.W.2d 913, 917 &
n.7 (1976).
149. See, e.g., Thompson v. Kiekhaefer, 372 F. Supp. 715, 720 (D. Minn. 1973) (when
two alternative forums are in close proximity to one another no substantial hardship to
either party exists); Anderson v. Luitjens, 311 Minn. 203, 209, 247 N.W.2d 913, 917 (1976)
(defendant "lives ... only about 23 miles from . . . where this case is venued").
150. See, e.g., Independent School Dist. No. 454 v, Marshall & Stevens Co., 337 F.
Supp. 1278, 1289 (D. Minn. 1971); American Pollution Prevention Co. v. National Alfalfa
Dehydrating & Milling Co., 304 Minn. 191, 196, 230 N.W.2d 63, 66 (when both parties
would have to transport evidence to trial, convenience factor not weighted either way),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 894 (1975).
Another aspect of convenience was at issue in Marshall & Stevens Co. In this case, in
which the plaintiff unquestionably had jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, the
jurisdictional issue was whether the nonresident defendant could invoke jurisdiction over
a third-party defendant. The court compared the inconvenience to the resident plaintiff
of complicating trial with the inconvenience to the defendant resulting from having to try
the third-party action in another forum. See Independent School Dist. No. 454 v. Marshall
& Stevens Co., 337 F. Supp. at 1288-89.
151. See, e.g., B & J Mfg. Co. v. Solar Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 594, 599 (8th Cir. 1973)
(no "exceptional hardship" to defendant), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974); Aftanase v.
Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965) (factor unpersuasive either way);
Franklin Mfg. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 297 Minn. 181, 184-85, 210 N.W.2d 227, 230 (1973)
(per curiam) ("inordinate burden" on defendant unlikely).
Unless an alternative forum is available, inconvenience should not be a factor when
minimum contacts have been established. See Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn.
77, 111, 172 N.W.2d 292, 312 (1969) ("[T]o say that it would be unfair to subject
[defendants] to suit would mean that the line is drawn between coming to Minnesota to
conspire and coming to Minnesota to defend an action based upon the conspiracy."), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970).
152. See, e.g., Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965); Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 295-97 (Minn. 1978).
153. See, e.g., Anderson v. Luitjens, 311 Minn. 203, 208, 247 N.W.2d 913, 916 (1976)
(quantity and quality factors combined); Franklin Mfg. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 297 Minn.
181, 184, 210 N.W.2d 227, 229 (1973) (per curiam) (same); Mid-Continent Freight Lines,
Inc. v. Highway Trailer Indus., Inc., 291 Minn. 251, 255-56, 190 N.W.2d 670, 673-74 (1971)
(three primary factors discussed together in terms of foreseeability of product reaching
Minnesota).
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they can recommend jurisdiction when any one factor alone would not
justify its exercise. 5
Ill.

THE MINNESOTA LONG ARM STATUTES

A.
1.

Introduction

The Two-Step Test

Whether a state has jurisdiction over a nonresident depends on a twostep approach, involving first, the state jurisdiction statutes and second,
due process limitations. 5 Before examining whether the requisite minimum contacts have occurred, a court, at least in theory, 5 ' determines
whether the applicable jurisdictional statutes encompass the nonresident defendant in a given fact situation. 57 Some statutes, as interpreted, are broader than due process permits, 58 whereas other statutes
do not contemplate jurisdiction that would otherwise be permissible
under the due process requirements. 58 When a statute does not permit
jurisdiction even though the requisite minimum contacts exist, the court
may not exercise jurisdiction. 6 ' Similarly, when a statute contemplates
154. See, e.g., Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 295 (Minn. 1978)
(when only contact is one isolated transaction, its nature and quality becomes dispositive); Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 298, 240 N.W.2d 814, 819 (1976)
(because contacts were substantial as to quantity and quality, they need not be related
to cause of action).
Apart from the minimum contacts tests arising out of the due process clause, additional
constitutional bases for restricting jurisdiction exist. See notes 108-18 supra and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Amba Marketing Sys., Inc. v. Jobar Int'l, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th
Cir. 1977); Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enterprises, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1366, 1368 (M.D.N.C.
1973).
156. As discussed below, see notes 181-83 infra and accompanying text, the distinction
between the statutory applicability test and the due process test is not always clear
because of the liberal interpretation given the state statutes. See 2 Moons's FEDERAL
PRACTCE 4.41-1[31, at 4-457 (2d ed. 1978) ("[fin many states, the only question to be
decided is whether it would offend due process to assert jurisdiction in the particular
case.").
157. See, e.g., Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1212, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Anderson v.
Luitjens, 311 Minn. 203, 206, 247 N.W.2d 913, 915 (1976); Hunt v. Nevada State Bank,
285 Minn. 77, 109, 172 N.W.2d 292, 311 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970).
158. See, e.g., Conwed Corp. v. Nortene, S.A., 404 F. Supp. 497, 505 (D. Minn. 1975);
Youngblood v. Citrus Assocs. of N.Y. Cotton Exch., Inc., 276 So. 2d 505, 507-08 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1973).
159. See, e.g., Youngblood v. Citrus Assocs. of N.Y. Cotton Exch., Inc., 276 So. 2d 505,
508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
160. See, e.g., Darden v. Heck's, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 727, 731-32 (W.D. Va. 1978) (dictum) (courts may not assert jurisdiction when affirmatively precluded by legislation);
Gahagan v. Patterson, 316 F. Supp. 1099, 1100-01 (D. Minn. 1970) (federal rules permit
long arm jurisdiction in federal court actions to extent contemplated by state long arm
statute); Guardian Packaging Corp. v. Kapak Indus., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 952, 953 (D.
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the nonresident defendant's act as a basis for jurisdiction, but the act
does not constitute a contact sufficient to meet the minimum contacts
threshold, personal jurisdiction will not be sustained. 6 , Only when both
the statute and due process authorize extraterritorial service of process
can a court exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

62

Among the contemporary state statutes, the broadest eliminate any
statutory language apart from the due process standard.- In the states
that specifically enumerate which actions invoke jurisdiction over a
defendant, some courts hold that the statutes should be construed
strictly,'" whereas others liberally construe the statutes. 6 5 In those
Minn. 1970) (federal courts should observe any state statutory limitations on jurisdiction

that are stricter than due process requires); Washington Scientific Indus., Inc. v. American Safeguard Corp., 308 F. Supp. 736, 739 (D. Minn. 1970) (agent's contact with state
on behalf of principal not within long arm statute so as to allow jurisdiction over agent);
cf. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952) (states are not compelled to assert jurisdiction to maximum limits of due process).
161. See, e.g., Smith v. Lloyd's of London, 568 F.2d 1115, 1118 n.7 (5th Cir. 1978)
(insurer who infrequently accepted policies through insurance agents in state may not
have had adequate contacts even if statute was applicable); Conwed Corp. v. Nortene,
S.A., 404 F. Supp. 497, 505 (D. Minn. 1975) (letter threatening patent infringement action
constituted "use of personal property" contemplated by statute but due process would be
offended by the assertion of jurisdiction); Gelineau v. New York Univ. Hosp., 375 F. Supp.
661, 668 (D.N.J. 1974) (even though service was proper under New Jersey statute, subjecting New York hospital to suit would violate due process because only contact with state
was treating one of its residents).
162. See, e.g., Conwed Corp. v. Nortene, S.A., 404 F. Supp. 497, 504-05 (D. Minn.
1975); Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn. 1978); Northern
States Pump & Supply Co. v. Baumann, 311 Minn. 368, 370, 249 N.W.2d 182,184 (1976).
163. For example, California's statute states: "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States." CAL. CIv. Ploc. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
For a compilation and discussion of the various long arm statutes, see Sutton, Today's
Long-Arm and Products Liability: A Plea for a Contemporary Notion of Fair Play and
Substantial Justice, 41 INs. CouNsEL J. 85, 89-95 (1974). Sutton groups the long arm
statutes into the following categories: "uniform act" statutes, "tortious act" statutes, "in
whole or in part" statutes, "accrual" statutes, "non-qualifying corporation" statutes,
"statutes by their very language permitting jurisdiction to the limits of due process," and
"miscellaneous statutes." See id. at 89.
164. See, e.g., Jennings v. McCall Corp., 320 F.2d 64, 72 (8th Cir. 1963) (Missouri courts
do not interpret foreign corporation statute to extend to limits of due process); American
Baseball Cap, Inc. v. Duzinski, 308 So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (party
seeking assertion of personal jurisdiction has burden to present facts that clearly justify
the applicability of statute; statute must be strictly construed).
165. See, e.g., Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1212, 1215-16 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Congress
intended broadest possible extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction); Clark Advertising
Agency, Inc. v. Tice, 331 F. Supp. 1058, 1059 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (Texas statute to be given
broadest possible construction), aff'd on other grounds, 490 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1974); Gray
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 11. 2d 432, 436, 176 N.E.2d 761, 763
(1961) (look to general purpose and effect rather than "technicalities of definition" to
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states with specific statutory criteria for personal jurisdiction that are
broadly interpreted to the extent permitted by due process, the two tests
for determining jurisdiction appear to overlap.
2.

The Minnesota Statutes

The early Minnesota long arm statutes related to nonresident motorists' 61 and foreign corporations doing business in the state.' 7 More recently, these older statutes have been amended and supplemented both
by long arm statutes affecting specific matters'" and a general personal
jurisdiction statute.'" The principle of the various statutes is the same:
to provide a basis for service of process on nonresident defendants who
have done either an act within the state or an act outside the state with
an effect within the state. Together, the statutes may provide overlapping bases for exerting jurisdiction.1 0 Of Minnesota's two long arm statdetermine legislative intent); Norton v. Local Loan, 251 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Iowa 1977)
(Iowa statute liberally construed).
For a criticism of broad statutory interpretation to the limits of due process, see Taylor
v. Portland Paramount Corp., 383 F.2d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 1967) ("what... courts have
done is to abdicate their duty to construe the statutes of their own states and to turn it
over to the Supreme Court of the United States").
166. The nonresident motorist statute is currently codified at MINN. STAT. § 170.55(1)
(1978). In pertinent part it reads:
The use and operation by a resident of this state or his agent, or by a nonresident
or his agent of a motor vehicle within the state of Minnesota, shall be deemed
an irrevocable appointment by such resident when he has been absent from this
state continuously for six months or more following an accident, or by such
nonresident at any time, of the commissioner of public safety to be his true and
lawful attorney upon whom may be served all legal process in any action or
proceeding against him or his executor, administrator, or personal representative growing out of such use and operation of a motor vehicle within this state,
resulting in damages or loss to person or property, whether the damage or loss
occurs on a highway or on abutting public or private property. . . . Service of
such process shall be made by serving a copy thereof upon the commissioner or
by filing such copy in his office, . . . and such service shall be sufficient service
upon the absent resident or the nonresident . . .; provided that notice of such
service and a copy of the process are within ten days thereafter sent by mail by
the plaintiff to the defendant at his last known address ....
Id. For a general discussion of service of process under state nonresident motorist, aircraft,
and watercraft statutes, see 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTI, supra note 156, at 4.41-1[2].
167. See Act of Apr. 20, 1935, ch. 200, § 13, 1935 Minn. Laws 369, 373-74 (current
version at MINN. STAT. § 303.13(1) (1978)).
168. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 60A.19(3), .21(2) (1978) (insurance regulation); id.
§ 80A.27(3)-(5), (7)-(8) (securities regulation); id. § 170.55 (nonresident motorists); id.
§ 518.11 (marriage dissolution); id. § 518A.05 (child custody). In a marriage dissolution a
court has no personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant unless personal service of
process is made within the state. See Allegrezza v, Allegrezza, 236 Minn. 464, 467, 53
N.W.2d 133, 135 (1952).
169. See MINN. STAT. § 543.19(1) (1978).
170. See, e.g., Anderson v. Luitjens, 311 Minn. 203, 207, 247 N.W.2d 913, 915-16 (1976).
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utes that are general in application, the older, single-act statute, 17
which only applies to foreign corporations,' is narrower in scope than
the personal jurisdiction statute, which applies to both foreign corporations and nonresident individuals.' Furthermore, unlike the single-act
171. MINN. STAT. § 303.13, subd. 1(3) (1978). This statute became the "doing business" statute, as amended in 1957. See Act of Apr. 20, 1957, ch. 538, 1957 Minn. Laws
672.
172. See MINN. STAT. § 303.13, subd. 1(3) (1978).
173. See id. § 543.19(1) (1978). The personal jurisdiction statute reads in part:
Subdivision 1. As to a cause of action arising from any acts enumerated in this
subdivision, a court of this state with jurisdiction of the subject matter may
exercise personal jurisdiction over any foreign corporation or any non-resident
individual, or his personal representative, in the same manner as if it were a
domestic corporation or he were a resident of this state. This section applies if,
in person or through an agent, the foreign corporation or non-resident individual:
(a) Owns, uses, or possesses any real or personal property situated in this
state, or
(b) Transacts any business within the state, or
(c) Commits any act in Minnesota causing injury or property damage, or
(d) Commits any act outside Minnesota causing injury or property damage
in Minnesota, subject to the following exceptions when no jurisdiction shall be
found:
(1) Minnesota has no substantial interest in providing a forum; or
(2) the burden placed on the defendant by being brought under
the state's jurisdiction would violate fairness and substantial justice;
or
(3) the cause of action lies in defamation or privacy.
Id. Clause (d) was amended in 1978. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 780, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws
1110, 1111-12. The former language of clause (d) read:
(d) Commits any tort outside of Minnesota causing injury or property damage within Minnesota, if, (1) at the time of the injury, solicitation or service
activities were carried on within Minnesota by or on behalf of the defendant, or
(2) products, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured by the
defendant were used or. consumed within Minnesota in the ordinary course of
trade.
Act of May 15, 1967, ch. 427, 1967 Minn. Laws 936, 937. The remaining subdivisions of
the statute read:
Subd. 2. The service of process on any person who is subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state, as provided in this section, may be made by personally
serving the summons upon the defendant outside this state with the same effect
as though the summons had been personally served within this state.
Subd. 3. Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated in subdivision 1
may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him
is based upon this section.
Subd. 4. Nothing contained in this section shall limit or affect the right to
serve any process in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law or the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.
Subd. 5. Non-resident individual, as used in this section, means any individual, or his personal representative, who is not domiciled or residing in the state
when suit is commenced.
MINN. STAT. § 543.19(2)-(5).(1978).
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statute for lawsuits in tort,"' the personal jurisdiction statute' has no
requirement that the plaintiff be a resident of Minnesota. 7 6 Interpreting
the statutes broadly, the Minnesota courts have construed the statutes
so that both the single-act statute's language "a contract . . . to be
performed in whole or in part"'' 7 and the personal jurisdiction statute's
language "transacts any business"'" 8 can apply with virtually equal
breadth. "' Similarly, the courts have not distinguished the personal
jurisdiction statute's application to tort actions from that of the singleact language applying to foreign corporations.", Thus, despite distinctions in the language of the two statutes, the differences are more apparent than real.
B.

Court Interpretationof the Statutes

Notwithstanding the two-step test requiring an analysis of the effect
of the statute separately from that of the minimum contacts test of due
process, the Minnesota state and federal courts have relied on the due
process standard to interpret the personal jurisdiction statutes."' Consonant with other jurisdictions,"S8 the Minnesota Supreme Court has held
consistently that the statutes should be interpreted broadly to the extent permitted by due process."3 In that spirit, the court has held that
although Minnesota's foreign corporation statute specifically excludes
174. See MINN. STAT. § 303.13, subd. 1(3) (1978).
175. Id. § 543.19(1).
176. Compare id. § 303.13, subd. 1(3) (1978) (single-act statute; plaintiff must be Minnesota resident) with id. § 543.19(1) (personal jurisdiction statute; no similar requirement).
177. Id. § 303.13, subd. 1(3).
178. Id. § 543.19(1)(b).
179. See, e.g., McQuay, Inc. v. Samuel Schlosberg, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 902, 903-05 (D.
Minn. 1971) (court implies that if due process had permitted exercise of personal jurisdiction, defendant's contract arguably came within language of both statutes); Franklin Mfg.
Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 297 Minn. 181, 183, 210 N.W.2d 227, 229 (1973) (per curiam)
(breach of contract; "[both] statutes are sufficiently broad to encompass the relationship
of plaintiff and defendant"). But see Pillsbury Co. v. Southern Ry., 336 F. Supp. 1377,
1379 (D. Minn. 1972) (dictum) (personal jurisdiction statute "not strictly applicable" to
case in which foreign corporation statute did apply).
180. See, e.g., Anderson v. Luitjens, 311 Minn. 203, 206, 247 N.W.2d 913, 915 (1976)
(although defendant offered plausible distinction in application of MrNN. STAT. § 303.13,
subd. 1(3) from that of MINN. STAT. § 543.19(1), both should be applied to limits permitted by due process); Mid-Continent Freight Lines, Inc. v. Highway Trailer Indus.,
Inc., 291 Minn. 251, 253-54, 190 N.W.2d 670, 672-73 (1971) (both statutes should be
applied to maximum limits consistent with due process).
181. See, e.g., Anderson v. Luitjens, 311 Minn. 203, 206, 247 N.W.2d 913, 915 (1976)
(Legislature's basic consideration was maximum extraterritorial jurisdiction permissible).
182. See note 165 supra and accompanying text.
183. See Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 191-92 (8th Cir. 1965); Anderson
v. Luitjens, 311 Minn. 203, 206-07, 247 N.W.2d 913, 915 (1976); cf. 2 MooR.'s FEDERAL
PRAcniC, supra note 15 $ 4.41-1[31, at 4-456 (federal courts have construed Minnesota
long arm statutes to broadest extent permitted by due process).
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insurance companies from its reach,' that same statute's single-act
provision applies to insurance transactions and events not contemplated
under the insurance statutes."" Thus, unless a statute specifically forbids extraterritorial personal service on a nonresident, as in the case of
a proceeding for alimony or its modern equivalent,' long arm statutes
pertaining to specific matters do not appear to preclude jurisdiction
under the general statutes.
7
Within the perimeters of the general personal jurisdiction statute,
the court's policy of interpreting the statute broadly resulted in the
court ignoring a statutory provision.'8 A Minnesota Supreme Court decision rendered superfluous the clause in Minnesota Statutes section
543.19 relating to torts committed outside the state that cause injury in
the state. In Anderson v. Luitjens,'5 9 a case involving a tortious act
committed in Iowa that resulted in injury in Minnesota, the court interpreted the personal jurisdiction statute so that an "injury" occurring in
80
Minnesota constituted commission of a tort in the state.
In Luitjens, teenagers from Minnesota were served liquor at an Iowa
tavern located three miles from the Minnesota state line. One of the
teenagers became intoxicated and subsequently, while driving back
from the tavern, was involved in a two-car accident in Minnesota approximately ten miles from the tavern. A passenger in the car driven by
the intoxicated teenager brought suit against four parties including the
tavern owner. Because Iowa law prohibits serving liquor to a minor or
to an intoxicated person, 19'three defendants, the two car drivers and the
184. See Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 103-04, 172 N.W.2d 292, 307-08
(1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970). The single-act statute, MINN. STAT. § 303.13
subd. 1(3) (1978), applies to foreign corporations, which are defined in MINN. STAT. §
303.02(4) (1978) to exclude insurance companies. Insurance companies are defined in
MINN. STAT. § 60A.02(4) (1978).
185. See Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 104, 172 N.W.2d 292, 308 (1969)
("There was an intended harmonious mesh between these two jurisdictional statutes;
[tihe legislature cannot have meant to grant immunity to the corporation aiding in a
tortious conversion in Minnesota merely because that organization is an insurance company."), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970).
186. See also 2 W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULmENT § 14.12 (2d ed. 1961). When no
other service is possible on a resident defendant, the courts permit service by publication.
See Gill v. Gill, 277 Minn. 166, 171, 152 N.W.2d 309, 313 (1967).
187. See Act of May 15, 1967, ch. 427, 1967 Minn. Laws 936 (current version at MINN.
STAT.

§ 543.19 (1978)).

188. Clause (d) of the original personal jurisdiction statute, Act of May 15, 1967, ch.
427, § 1(1)(d), 1967 Minn. Laws 936, 937 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 543.19(1)(d)
(1978)), was ignored by the court in Anderson v. Luitjens. See 311 Minn. at 206-07, 247
N.W.2d at 915-16.
189. 311 Minn. 203, 247 N.W.2d 913 (1976).
190. See id. at 206, 247 N.W.2d at 915.
191. See id. at 205, 247 N.W.2d at 914 (construing IowA CODE §§ 123.47, .49(1), .49(2)(h)
(1975)).
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owner of one car, cross-claimed for contribution and indemnity against
the tavern owner. The trial court dismissed the action against the tavern
owner for lack of personal jurisdiction, but the Minnesota Supreme

Court reversed.

'9

Relying on section 543.19 clause (c)-"commits any tort in Minnesota"' 5 -the court made no reference to clause (d)-"commits any tort
outside of Minnesota causing injury or property damage within Minnesota if the defendant were engaging in other activities in the state." 4
Clause (d) would seem to have been applicable,9 5 and, two years later,
in a case presenting closely parallel facts,"' the defendant specifically
argued that the clause (d) language-"commits any tort outside of Minnesota"-should control.9 7 Nonetheless, referring to its earlier decision,
the court held that clause (c) governed not only because the injury
occurred in Minnesota but also because the defendant failed to present
a compelling argument as to why clause (d) should govern.'"9 Because
the court relied on the due process standard to interpret the statute
broadly, ignoring the restrictive wording in clause (d), the Luitjens decision illustrates that to some degree, despite continued acknowledgment
of the two-step test, the two tests for determining jurisdiction are
blurred.'"
192. See 311 Minn. at 204, 212, 247 N.W.2d at 914, 918.
193. Act of May 15, 1967, ch. 427, § 1(1)(c), 1967 Minn. Laws 936, 936 (current version
at MINN. STAT. § 543.19(1)(c) (1978)).
194, See 311 Minn. at 205-07, 247 N.W.2d at 915-16. The court's decision contravened
what the court has described as a "duty" to reconcile related provisions if possible. See
Roinestad v. McCarthy, 249 Minn. 396, 405, 82 N.W.2d 697, 703 (1957); cf. MINN. STAT.
§ 645.16 (1978) ("Every law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions."); id. § 645.17(2) ("The legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and
certain ....
").
195. If clause (d) had been applied, it is difficult to formulate a rationale that would
have permitted the state to assert jurisdiction over the defendant. A possible rationale
would have been that a "tort" consists not only of the intentional or negligent act, but
the resulting harm or damage as well. In Anderson v. Luitjens, for example, the act was
committed in Iowa while the harm occurred in Minnesota. Thus, the "tort" was committed, in part, in each state.
196. CompareBlamey v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884, 885-86 (Minn. 1978), petition for cert.
filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Mar. 6,1979) (No. 78-1100) with Anderson v. Luitjens, 311
Minn. 203, 204-05, 247 N.W.2d 913, 914 (1976).
In Blarney, a small liquor establishment owned by a sole proprietor and located in
Wisconsin, close to the state border and near the exit to an interstate highway, sold offsale beer to a minor from Minnesota. Later, the car driven by the minor who purchased
the beer was involved in a one-car accident in Minnesota, resulting in injury to the fifteenyear-old plaintiff, a passenger in the car. The teenagers had driven to Wisconsin solely
for the purpose of obtaining beer. See Blarney v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d at 885-86.
197. See Blamey v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d at 886.
198. See id. at 886-87.
199. Cf. Taylor v. Portland Paramount Corp., 383 F.2d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 1967) (state
courts fail to interpret statutes independently from constitutional standard); McQuay,
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Legislative Response: Amendment of the Personal Jurisdiction
Statute

Responding favorably to the result in Luitjens,"0 the Minnesota Legislature amended the personal jurisdiction statute by removing the old
language in clause (d) and substituting a more general set of requirements as to when acts committed outside the state result in injury inside
the state. 20' Under the amendment, jurisdiction over nonresident defendants is permitted for an "act" committed outside Minnesota that
results in injury or property damage in the state, provided that none of
the following three elements is present: jurisdiction is not permitted
when Minnesota has no substantial interest in providing a forum, when,
by permitting jurisdiction, the burden on a defendant would violate
fairness and substantial justice, or when the cause of action lies in
20 2
defamation or invasion of privacy.
1.

Substantial State Interest

A substantial state interest has been defined in relation to the due
process test. In that context, the state has a substantial interest in
providing a means of redress for its residents to ensure them maximum
protection against injuries caused by nonresidents.20 3 Therefore, the
Inc. v. Samuel Schlosberg, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 902, 905 (D. Minn. 1971) (because the state
supreme court interprets the statutes as extending to the limits of due process, the federal
court need not determine how the state supreme court would decide the case; the state
court would not be more restrictive than and could not exceed federal constitutional
standards).
200. 311 Minn. 203, 247 N.W.2d 913 (1976).
201. Compare MINN. STAT. § 543.19(1)(d) (1978) (containing amended language) with
Act of May 15, 1967, ch. 427, § 1(1)(d), 1967 Minn. Laws 936, 937 (amended 1978). Also,
the Legislature substituted the word "act" to replace the word "tort" in clause (c). See
Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 780, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws 1110, 1111 (current version at MNN.
STAT. § 543.19(1)(c) (1978)). Arguably, this change was made to keep clauses (c) and (d)
parallel in language. The change from "tort" to "act" in clause (d) arguably was made to
prevent the need for determining the situs of any tort that is asserted in a cause of action.
See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 780, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws 1110, 1111 (current version at MiNN.
STAT. § 543.19(1)(c) (1978)).
202. See MINN. STAT. § 543.19(1)(d) (1978).
203. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (state has
"manifest interest" when claim is less than cost of bringing action in foreign jurisdiction,
placing resident at "severe disadvantage"); B & J Mfg. Co. v. Solar Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d
594, 598-99 (8th Cir. 1973) (state has interest when plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment
that defendant's patent was invalid and not infringed), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974);
Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 196, 197 (8th Cir. 1965) (state has manifest
interest in providing residents means of redress for insurance claims; state has lesser but
"not insignificant" interest in products liability claims of residents); Thompson v. Kiekhaefer, 372 F. Supp. 715, 720 (D. Minn. 1973) (substantial interest in providing a forum
for alleged libel decreases when an alternative forum is available without imposing hardship on resident plaintiff); United Barge Co. v. Logan Charter Serv., Inc., 237 F. Supp.
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state interest probably increases inversely to the feasibility of pursuing
a claim out of state 04 Apart from the state interest in protecting its
residents, another interest recognized by the United States Supreme
Court is the state's ability to resolve property disputes 0 5 and ensure the
marketability of property in the state.2" Thus, a substantial state interest appears to derive from the nature of the relationship between the
state and the cause of action. This interest increases when no other state
has equivalent contacts, such as in multiparty litigation involving defendants from several states.207 Another aspect of the state interest,
when Minnesota has closer ties with the defendants than any other
forum in relation to the action, is an interest in promoting "judicial
economy." 208
Whatever the eventual parameters of "a substantial state interest in
the cause of action," 2 9 the presence of this language in the amendment
implies that for acts committed outside the state clause (d) of the statute requires finding a substantial state interest even if the minimum
contacts standard is less restrictive. Presently, the five-factor test of
minimum contacts used in Minnesota, by not requiring a substantial
state interest, 20 potentially appears to be less restrictive than the statute.
624, 627 (D. Minn. 1964) (state has policy of providing a forum for residents who suffer
harm from actions of nonresidents); Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539, 546 (D. Minn.
1964) (for products liability claims, state has "important interest" in providing forum for

injured residents); Northern States Pump & Supply Co. v. Baumann, 311 Minn. 368, 374,
249 N.W.2d 182, 186 (1976) (when state resident alleges breach of contract, state
"obviously has an interest in providing a forum"); Anderson v. Luitjens, 311 Minn. 203,

209, 247 N.W.2d 913, 917 (1976) (because plaintiffs are residents, state has "strong interest" in providing a forum); cf. Mid-Continent Freight Lines, Inc. v. Highway Trailer
Indus., Inc., 291 Minn. 251, 256, 190 N.W.2d 670, 674 (1971) (because third-party plaintiff

was a nonresident, state interest was minimal in asserting jurisdiction over nonresident
third-party defendant).
204. See, e.g., Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 196, 197 (8th Cir. 1965);

Thompson v. Kiekhaefer, 372 F. Supp. 715, 720 (D. Minn. 1973); cf. Hunt v. Nevada State
Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 111-12, 172 N.W.2d 292, 312 (1969) (court implied that state has
interest when defendants have relied on state laws), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970).
205. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 (1977) (dictum).

206. See, e.g., id. at 207-08.
207. Cf. Ellwein v. Sun-Rise, Inc., 295 Minn. 109, 110, 203 N.W.2d 403, 405 (1972)

(Minnesota was focal point of corporate activity in shareholders' derivative suit); Hunt
v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 111, 172 N.W.2d 292, 312 (1969) (defendants protected by Minnesota contract law would, if not tried in Minnesota, not be tried anywhere),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970).
208. See, e.g., Ellwein v. Sun-Rise, Inc., 295 Minn. 109, 110, 203 N.W.2d 403, 405
(1972).
209. MINN. STAT. § 543.19(1)(d)(1) (1978).
210. See notes 119-54 supra and accompanying text.
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2. Fairness and Substantial Justice
The second element that can prevent an exercise of jurisdiction is a
burden on the defendant that is violative of fairness and substantial
justice."' By incorporating this language into the statute, the amendment gives the courts statutory authority to find jurisdiction under the
statute so long as the exercise of jurisdiction is fair. As has been discussed, the statutory language technically is independent of the constitutional standard."' Thus, with regard to the first step in the two-step
test, a judicial determination of fairness under the statute theoretically
may be narrower than the constitutional requirement. 1 3 Even if the fivefactor test is satisfied, the courts under the statute can make a distinction based on criteria other than contacts, such as the relative mobility
or national-versus-local character of the parties."' Thus, the courts have
statutory authority to shape a standard of fairness for nonresident defendants who have committed an act outside the state, causing injury
or property damage in the state. Of course, if the courts interpret the
amendment to be a legislative adoption of the due process standard the
statute will not function independently of the due process standard.
While the new language does not appear to mandate a departure from
the results in recent long arm jurisdiction cases, the amended law restores the integrity of the analytic framework in the two-step test 15 by
permitting the courts to consider whether fairness and substantial jus211. See

MINN. STAT.

§ 543.19(1)(d)(2) (1978).

212. See notes 155-65 supra and accompanying text.

213. See id.
214. As a hypothetical example, assume a nonresident small retailer is about to be sued.
In one fact situation the retailer initiated the inquiry that led to a franchise relationship
for certain products with a national manufacturer headquartered in Minnesota. Arising
out of this relationship are several contacts between the retailer and the manufacturer in
Minnesota related to marketing strategies. After a dispute develops between the retailer
and manufacturer the manufacturer has grounds to assert that the retailer has converted
the manufacturer's property, and the retailer writes a letter to his national association of
retailers alleging that the manufacturer engaged in deception.
In the alternative fact situation, assume that the same nonresident retailer sells a
defective product to a Minnesota resident. Prior to the sale, completed in the retailer's
home state, the purchaser informed the retailer he was taking the product to Minnesota,
and the retailer guaranteed the product's quality. The retailer has a small number of sales
of similar products to other Minnesota residents. Upon returning to Minnesota the purchaser is injured by the product.
In both situations, the retailer has committed an act outside the state resulting in
consequences in the state. Arguably, the considerable burden on the retailer to come to
Minnesota is less fair in a suit by the national manufacturer than in one by the purchaser.
The five-factor test, however, is satisfied in both instances. If the courts use the statute
to determine fairness and justice, the courts can distinguish the two situations on some
basis other than minimum contacts.
215. See notes 155-65, 181-99 supra and accompanying text.
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tice are achieved without having to rely on the due process clause as the
source of the test.
3. Defamation and Privacy Lawsuits
The third element of the amended clause (d) prohibits jurisdiction
when the act committed outside the state is the basis of an action in
defamation or privacy." ' Although the legislative history supplies negligible background for the provision,"' a suggested rationale is that two
related factors prompted the Legislature to enact this exception to extraterritorial personal jurisdiction."' One factor is the precedent of a
similar prohibition under New York law."1 ' The other factor is the potential for a chilling effect on first amendment interests in freedom of
speech and press:20 because no evidence of physical or economic loss is
apparent, the possibility of frivolous suits may increase.,' The resulting
burden would fall most heavily on small-scale publications, those least
able to defend themselves even in the preliminary stage of a lawsuit.2 t'
Large-scale media enterprises conducting activity in Minnesota cannot
216. See MINN. STAT. § 543.19(1)(d)(3) (1978).
217. Although proponents of the amendment had prepared information in support of
the defamation and privacy exception, see Statement of Lobbyists (Aug. 11, 1979) (on file
in William Mitchell Law Review office), no questions were raised by the legislators during
committee hearings. See, e.g., Tapes of Hearings on S.F. 1862 Before the Minnesota
Senate Judiciary Comm., 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess.; Tapes of Hearings on S.F. 1862
Before the Subcomm. on Judicial Administration of the Minnesota Senate Judiciary
Comm., 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess.
218. These factors were discussed by proponents of the bill with individual legislators.
See Statement of Lobbyists (Aug. 11, 1979) (on file in William Mitchell Law Review
office).
219. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1977-1978);
McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries, in N.Y. Civ. Puc. LAW C302:18, at 86 (McKinney
1972). The statute provides:
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising from
any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person
or through an agent:
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character
arisingfrom the act ....
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1977-1978) (emphasis added).
220. See Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 110, 172 N.W.2d 292, 311 (1969)
(dictum), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970); note 218 supra.
221. Cf. Amba Marketing Sys., Inc. v. Jobar Int'l, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 788 n.4 (9th Cir.
1977) (dictum) (distinction can be made between injury-causing events and more amorphous tort claims such as patent and trademark infringement and unfair competition).
222. For an example of the costs that can accrue to a publisher in order to obtain a
summary judgement in a frivolous suit, see D. GLLMOR & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 182 (2d ed. 1974).
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seek protection within the exception, however, because they are susceptible to jurisdiction under clause (b) for transacting business in the
state.2 3
Because the Legislature imposed the specific privacy and defamation
exception to the general rule permitting jurisdiction for injuries occurring in the state, the Minnesota courts should give effective meaning to
the exception, particularly in view of strong first amendment interests ."' If the courts were to permit jurisdiction, independent of the exception, on the basis of a telephone interview or a single in-state interview under either the "transacts any business" clause or the "commits
any act in Minnesota" clause, the exception largely would be obviated.
Furthermore, because an interview in Minnesota may not be causally
related to an alleged injury from an out-of-state publication, jurisdiction
should not be based on the "commits an act in Minnesota" clause. One
additional factor suggests that the courts should develop a meaningful
exception to jurisdiction for out-of-state acts related to causes of action
in defamation and privacy: the Legislature's amendment relating to
defamation and privacy cases is the procedural complement to the Minnesota Supreme Court's adoption in 1978 of the single-publication
rule, 15 a substantive rule that states that the good faith distribution of
defamatory material previously published does not constitute a republication. 6 Therefore, the "commits any act in Minnesota" clause should
not be construed to include acts that are within the normal sale and
distribution of the material subsequent to the actual publication of the
material.
4.

A Look to the Future

By amending the personal jurisdiction statute, the Legislature has
223. See MINN. STAT. § 543.19(1)(b) (1978); cf. McLaughlin, PracticeCommentaries in
N.Y. Ctv. PR.c. LAw C302:18, at 86 (McKinney 1972) ("Of course, if there is an independent source of jurisdiction dehors this [New York] statute jurisdiction may be acquired.").
224. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
225. See Church of Scientology v. Minnesota State Medical Ass'n Foundation, 264
N.W.2d 152, 155 (Minn. 1978).
226. "Under the 'single-publication rule,' the statute of limitations begins to run when
a mass-produced newspaper, book, or magazine is first released to the public." Id. at 155.
Subsequent incidental republications do not trigger a new period for the statute to run
against the original publisher. See id.
A state rule of civil procedure has been held to deny jurisdiction in a case involving
interstate publication of an allegedly defamatory blacklist. See Bethany Auto Sales, Inc.
v. Aptco Auto Auction, Inc., 564 F.2d 895, 896-97 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (allegation
of harm or injury from interstate publication does not constitute an event within the state
which confers personal jurisdiction). Had the plaintiff established that a republication
occurred within the state, the court might have permitted jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants having no contacts with the state. See id. at 897.
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authorized Minnesota courts to incorporate whatever tests are advisable
to determine the issue of long arm jurisdiction as it relates to acts
committed outside the state resulting in an injury in Minnesota. Thus,
independent of the authority of the constitutional due process standard,
the courts can employ tests akin to the five-factor test. With the new
language, the courts in Minnesota have clear statutory authority to
achieve fairness and justice while accommodating changing technological and social circumstances, so long as the courts comply with the
limitations imposed by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process clause under the minimum contacts standard.
IV.

A

PROPOSED SUPPLEMENT TO THE MINIMUM CONTACTS STANDARD

Practically speaking, the results of the application of the minimum
contacts standard seem fair and reasonable. 2 1 The standard's validity
in terms of its current practical effects, however, should be distinguished from the standard's potential for usefulness in the future as well
as the adequacy of the principle of fairness and substantial justice as a
limitation of the minimum contacts standard. Two problems are inherent in due process as it is elaborated currently by the minimum contacts
standard.
The first problem is the potential for the decreasing meaningfulness
of contacts alone in determining the issue of personal jurisdiction.
Whether the standard is couched in terms of purposeful contacts or in
terms of a group of factors that examines the context and character of
the contact, the minimum contacts standard relies primarily on an examination of the contacts themselves.22 Seemingly, some national and
international networks of activity could effect, more or less simultaneously, the requisite minimum contacts between the defendant and a
number of jurisdictions. For example, in the evolving use of electronic
227. An apt summarization of the operation of the law of personal jurisdiction has been
made by Moore:
It is not possible within the limitations of [Moore's treatise] to analyze and
compare the hundreds of state and federal decisions applying [the] basic due
process principles, but a few generalizations may be made. If there are substantial contacts with the state, for example a substantial and continuing business,
and if the cause of action arises out of those contacts, jurisdiction will be sustained. If there are substantial contacts with the state, but the cause of action
does not arise out of these contacts, jurisdiction may be sustained. If there is a
minimum of contacts, and the cause of action arises out of the contacts, it will
normally be fair and reasonable to sustain jurisdiction. But if there is a minimum of contacts, and the cause of action does not arise out of the contacts, there
will normally be no basis of jurisdiction, since it is difficult to establish the
factors necessary to meet the fair and reasonable test.
2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 156, T 4.41-1[3], at 4-451 to -454 (footnotes
omitted).
228. See notes 63-68, 152-54 supra and accompanying text.
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information relay systems in governmental, banking, and commercial
transactions,m contacts by users may be so continuous and plentiful as
to justify jurisdiction over the user in several states.130 Under these circumstances, some basis independent of the contacts themselves seems
desirable to examine the appropriateness of exerting personal jurisdiction in a particular forum.
The second problem, interrelated with and intensified by the first,
relates to whether the principle of fairness and substantial justice23' is
sufficient to resolve the issue of personal jurisdiction. To understand
this problem, the development of due process in personal jurisdiction
must be recalled. Apart from its application to a specific legal context,
due process imposes no specific procedural requirements. The first standard giving concrete meaning to due process in personal jurisdiction was
territoriality, based on the theory of exclusive jurisdiction. 2 Territorial229. See, e.g., 34 ALB. L. Rav. 752, 755-56 (1970) (telephone calls to forum state). See
generally NATIONAL COMM'N ON ELECTRONIC FUND TRANsnRs, EFT AND THE PUBLIC
INTEr 17-37, 93-114 (1977) (consumer issues, branch terminal issues, and technological
concerns); R. SMITH, THE WIRED NATION 83-99 (1972) (privacy concerns of cable television
allowing two-way communication between broadcaster and home viewer).
230. For a case involving a computer file that resulted in plaintiffs detention in different parts of the country by police when he came in routine contact with authorities, see
Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Wis. 1975). The defendant, the Louisiana police,
accused of negligently failing to remove plaintiff's name from computer bank, argued
unsuccessfully that the long arm statute was not intended to apply to use by police and
prosecutors of records in the National Crime Information Center. See id. at 767.
In another context, the minimum contacts standard is, arguably, insufficient to analyze
adequately the use of garnishment statutes to effect jurisdiction. Cases relating to the use
of garnishment statutes include: O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994
(E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 639 (1978); Rintala
v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 1973); Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 245
N.W.2d 624 (1976), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), aff'd on remand, 272
N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), prob.juris noted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3553 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1979) (No.
78-952); Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). The
method of gaining jurisdiction is to garnish the contractual obligation of an insurer doing
business in the state to defend and indemnify the nonresident defendant insured. For
example, if two residents of a state have a car accident and the complaining party subsequently changes residency to a state with which the defendant has no contacts other than
the insurer's policy obligation, the new state of residency may be able to gain jurisdiction
over the nonresident defendant to the limits of his or her insurance policy. Whether the
insurer does business in the new state of the plaintiffs residency is determinative. See,
e.g., Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888, 891-93 (Minn. 1978), prob. juris. noted, 47
U.S.L.W. 3553 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1979) (No. 78-952).
The main justification of the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision to permit jurisdiction
under the above circumstances is the reasonableness of such jurisdiction in terms of
fairness and minimum contacts. See id. at 892-93. Without questioning the court's conclusion, the analysis, arguably, would be more effective if the result could be justified in
terms of the orderly administration of laws as well as in terms of the fair administration
of laws.
231. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
232. See notes 25-30, 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
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ity's evolution into the minimum contacts standard demonstrates that
due process could not be effectuated by limiting personal service of
process to within the forum's boundaries.2 31 Rather, the law has observed
that cumulative transactions or events routinely can involve residents
of different states. What replaced the original equation of due process
with exclusive territorial jurisdiction was the equation of due process
with extraterritorial jurisdiction, to the extent that minimum contacts
34
result in fair play and substantial justice.
The problem is that the principle of fairness and substantial justice
is itself a highly flexible boundary. Arguably, because the fairness and
substantial justice principle is general and elastic, it does not comprise
a limitation on minimal purposeful contacts that is any more concrete
or measurable than the threshold concept of "due process of law."235 In
those instances in which the contacts between a defendant and a forum
provide an inadequate basis for resolving the constitutional issues affecting personal jurisdiction,25 no independent and concrete criterion of
due process exists. Yet, some criterion is desirable. Without one, the
constitutional doctrine of due process remains an abstraction. The application of constitutional doctrines should not be confused with the
application of moral truth.2 7 The justification on constitutional grounds
for a particular application of the law should be more than: "Because
the result is fair and just." Otherwise, the constitutional justification
precludes discussion and interpretation.
A rationale that can supplement the minimum contacts standard
exists. Already alluded to in InternationalShoe, 1 this rationale was
suggested by the court's statement that "[wihether due process is satisfied must depend upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administrationof the laws which it was the
purpose of the due process clause to insure."1 Due process requires not
233. See notes 47-50, 64-68 supra and accompanying text.
234. See id.
235. Cf. Twerski, supra note 80, at 245 ("Overall fairness to everyone may be a desideratum of the common law but it is not the foundation of the due process clause. If we desire
to engage in a common law evaluation of fairness to all parties, then the due process clause
ceases to be the vehicle for limiting the exercise of jurisdiction.").
236. See notes 229-30 supra and accompanying text.
237. Law should not be considered the equivalent of morality. See Holmes, The Path
of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Rav. 457, 459-60, 464 (1897). "[NJothing but confusion of thought
can result from assuming that the rights of man in a moral sense are equally rights in the
sense of the Constitution and the law." Id. at 460. Absolute truth should be distinguished
from instrumental truth; the former is beyond human comprehension and the latter is
subject to influence and change. See A. WHEELIS, THE END OF THE MoDnN AGE 107
(Harper Torchbook ed. 1973) (quoting K. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REPUTATIONS 29

(1963)).
238. 326 U.S. at 319.
239. Id. (emphasis added).
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only fairness but the orderly administration of justice. In addition to
promoting those elements pertaining to the fairness to the parties, this
principle, in terms of the capabilities of the legal system, invokes a
practical measure of the implications of asserting jurisdiction. Otherwise, without the practical measure, the more abstract principle of fairness may foster a result that would hinder some other public policy.
Support for the fair and orderly administration of laws standard can
be found in other United States Supreme Court decisions. 40 In Kulko
v. Superior Court,211the California Supreme Court had determined that
sufficient purposeful contacts existed between a nonresident defendant
and the state to permit the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident
in a cause of action relating to child support.242 Holding that jurisdiction
over the defendant would be unreasonable, the United States Supreme
Court reversed2 3 and noted that, given the facts of the case, to permit
jurisdiction over a parent concerning the issue of child support could
burden unreasonably family cooperation and support, which public policy seeks to promote. 244 Impliedly, the Court's opinion suggests that even
if personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant were fair, due process can prohibit such jurisdiction if an exercise of jurisdiction inhibits
effective government by thwarting some other public policy. 4 5Thus, the
exercise of personal jurisdiction must be consistent with the orderly
administration of laws as well as fairness and substantial justice.
Conversely, an assertion of jurisdiction may not be necessary to
achieve the orderly administration of laws. In Kulko, the Court stated
that two factors affected the sufficiency of the state interest to assert
jurisdiction over a nonresident father. One was the lack of a special
jurisdictional statute relating to a nonresident parent.2 46 The other factor was California's participation in a uniform reciprocal support law
that provided a means of securing child support from nonresident defendants without either party having to leave his or her home state." 7
Apparently using those factors, the Court examined by what means, if
240. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-10 (1977).

241. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
242. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586
(1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
243. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92, 96, 101 (1978). The Court noted that
because both California and New York were signatories of uniform support acts, the
plaintiff had a viable means of both prosecuting and collecting her claim in a New York
court. See id. at 99-100 & 100 n.14.
244. See id. at 98.
245. See, e.g., 24 ALA. L. REV. 634, 640 (1972) (multiple factors can affect decision of
whether exercise of personal jurisdiction is appropriate).
246. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978).
247. See id. at 98-100.
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any, the legal system presently provides effective redress for a plaintiff.
The combined effect of the absence of a special jurisdiction statute with
the existence of a law that made out-of-state relief feasible suggested
that personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Kulko was not necessary
for the plaintiff to obtain redress." '
Arguably, an exercise of personal jurisdiction should be examined not
only with respect to the minimum contacts standard, but also with
respect to a standard that represents the orderly administration of laws
element of due process. Such a standard, termed the "federal interest
standard," would be broader than each state's parochial interest in
providing a forum for its residents 2 and protecting the marketability
of property within its boundaries.2 50 Four factors should comprise the
federal interest standard: (1) the interest in providing an effective
means of redress for plaintiffs; (2) the interest in preventing the creation
of a category of judgment proof defendants;25 (3) the interest in effecting
a reasonable division of labor among states affected by multistate activity;?- and (4) the interest in advancing other public policies, such as first
amendment and interstate commerce interests. Additionally, the federal interest standard should examine the effect of an assertion of jurisdiction on the orderly administration of laws in cases in which jurisdiction is not clearly precluded on the basis of insufficient contacts. In
contrast, when no contacts exist or they are unrelated and clearly insufficient to permit fairness and substantial justice, the federal interest
standard would be inapplicable.23
248. See id. Even if jurisdiction had been necessary, the minimum contacts standard
would require some contact between the state and the defendant. See id. at 100-01. A
specific statute authorizing jurisdiction for a particular type of activity arguably lowers
the threshold of minimum contacts. On the other hand, the existence of laws providing a
practical means for the plaintiff to obtain relief outside the state could raise the minimum
contacts threshold.
249. See notes 144-45 supra and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1977).
251. See note 77 supra and accompanying text; cf Hunt. v. Nevada State Bank, 285
Minn. 77, 111, 172 N.W.2d 292, 312 (1969) (in multiparty litigation it is fair to assert
jurisdiction over defendants who if not tried in the forum probably will not be tried at
all), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970).
252. The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized impliedly this federal interest in
Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 172 N.W.2d 292 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1010 (1970), by noting the fairness of exercising jurisdiction over several nonresident
defendants who, "if not tried in this forum and in these same proceedings, would probably
not face trial anywhere. Minnesota, so far as appears, is the only state having significant
contacts with all the defendants to this complicated multiparty litigation." Id. at-111, 172
N.W.2d at 312; cf. Ellwein v. Sun-Rise, Inc., 295 Minn. 109, 110, 203 N.W.2d 403, 405
(1972) (when nonresident defendants were in a position to direct, manage, and control
manner in which Minnesota corporation did business within the state, court held there
was no more convenient forum than Minnesota).
253. Cf. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 100-01 (1978) (without contact between
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When the sufficiency of the contacts is debatable, the federal interest
standard should determine the effect on the parties and the courts of
both a denial and of a grant of jurisdiction. Thus, the courts should
ascertain whether the plaintiff has any practical means of redress in the
legal system either within the forum or without. In causes of action
involving several nonresident defendants, the forum state may have
stronger contacts with some defendants than with others. To prevent
creating a category of judgment proof defendants in these cases, a lower
threshold of minimum contacts should be acceptable with regard to
defendants whose contacts might be insufficient if no other defendants
were involved. The courts could then examine from the standpoint of
the efficiency of the courts whether the state is the most reasonable
forum in which to litigate."'
When the contacts are clearly sufficient to permit fairness and substantial justice to the parties, the federal interest standard should inquire whether, despite the presence of minimum contacts, the assertion
of jurisdiction would adversely affect other public policy. For example,
the constitutional interest in promoting interstate commerce requires
protection of that activity,2 5 although the orderly administration of laws
probably would not permit protection in a manner that diminishes access to reasonable means of redress for injuries to plaintiffs.
In addition to the interstate commerce clause, another constitutional
consideration is the first amendment interest in freedom of speech and
press.2" As discussed earlier, courts have recognized the potential for
problems in this area resulting from expanded long arm jurisdiction. 17
To protect this constitutional interest, without creating a blanket constitutional exemption, the constitutional right of freedom of speech and
press can be viewed as an element of the orderly administration of laws.
As such, first amendment policies could require that the threshold of
minimum contacts be measured in terms of whether a chilling effect
might occur if jurisdiction were permitted. Through this method courts
could adjust the threshold of contacts in view of the characteristics of
defendant and forum state a substantial state interest alone cannot justify personal jurisdiction over defendant).
254. See Ellwein v. Sun-Rise, Inc., 295 Minn. 109, 110-12, 203 N.W.2d 403, 405-06
(1972) (as the focal point of corporate communications, Minnesota had sufficient contacts
with all defendant directors; to deny jurisdiction would require relitigation in several
states). The reasonableness of the forum in relation to judicial economy should be distinguished from the reasonableness in relation to the convenience of the parties which is
addressed within the minimum contacts analysis. See notes 148-51 supra and accompanying text.
255. See notes 108-11 supra and accompanying text. See generally 16 ST. Louis U.L.J.
131 (1971).
256. See notes 112-18 supra and accompanying text.
257. See id.
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the nonresident publisher: a national publisher may be capable of defending in a state when a very small publisher having an equal number
of contacts is not. Thus, even if in both instances the current tests of
fairness would permit jurisdiction, the orderly administration of law
would only permit the exercise of jurisdiction when no chilling effect is
likely to result.2
V.

CONCLUSION

An objective analysis of due process in personal jurisdiction is articulated only partially by the minimum contacts standard, which addresses
most directly the "fair administration of laws." To supplement this
standard, this Note suggests that the conceptual framework of due process be augmented by a federal interest standard articulating the
"orderly administration of laws." Together, the two elements of the
principle "the fair and orderly administration of laws" balance the conceptual framework of due process between the ideal of fairness and the
existing legal system's capabilities, ensuring that the law itself be perceived as a tool of finite capabilities.2 9
By imposing a measurable standard of due process, a just and even
application of the constitutional standard is more likely than if the
standard is extremely elastic. Since feudal times, legal documents have
established that the legitimate exercise of power should be circumscribed10 by due process of law to prevent the intemperate and uneven
application of the law.26 ' Unless the constitutional principle of due
process is imbued with measurable qualities, however, its very elasticity
can result in imparting the immense authority of the Constitution upon
2 2
subjective judgments.
258. Alternative means could be developed for safeguarding nonresident defendants
over whom jurisdiction is permitted. For example, when first amendment interests are
involved, courts could be empowered to require that the plaintiff post a bond to be paid
to the defendant should the court determine the claim was frivolous. Cf. 18 WAYNE L. REv.
1585, 1598 (1972) (long arm statutes should provide for posting of bond to cover defendant's litigation expenses in the event of a frivolous claim).
259. See Holmes, supra note 237, at 459-60, 469. "[A] body of law is more rational and
more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end
which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are stated or are ready to
be stated in words." Id. at 469.
260. Predating American colonial history, the concept of due process of law is recognized to have been first generally expressed in eleventh century feudal decrees. See R.
Mo'rr, DuE PROCESS OF LAW § 1 (2d ed. 1973). The phrase "due process of law" was first
used against illegal deprivation of liberties in the fourteenth century when the King
reaffirmed the Magna Carta during a political crisis. See id. § 2, at 4-5 & 5 n.11.
261. See generally id. § 3, at 6; id. § 26, at 71-72 (abuses of royal power); id. § 3, at 7 &
n.23 (abolition of Star Chamber).
262. Cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 325 (1945) (Black, J.,
concurring) (natural justice concepts of fair play, justice, and reasonableness can result
in unfortunate abridgment of constitutional safeguards).
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Related to these concerns about unfairness and rigidity in the law is
the principle that constitutional principles should be distinguished from
philosophic goals and theories. 63 Although without question, aspirational goals are a necessary component of the legal system, in the search
for the means of effecting these aspirations standards must evolve that
are measurable and concrete. Through objective rules and tests the
decision is made as to which values to defend at a given moment and
how to reconcile society's conflicting demands.28 4 Otherwise, "[wihen
the thinker who claims to possess the charter of social order merges with
the statesman who justifies his actions as a consequence of universal
2' 5
truth, where will ordinary people turn for support of their claims?" '
Today, the possibilities for continuing and multistate transactions are
enlarging. In this context, the orderly administration of laws standard
offers to supplement the minimum contacts standard to provide a concrete yet flexible basis for determining the issue of whether the due
process clause permits an exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-,
resident defendant.
263. Practical decisions cannot be made wisely solely on the basis of abstract philosophical theory. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & PoLrmcs 253-59 (1975). "If philosophy were a
concrete knowledge, the best philosopher would indeed be the best ruler." Id. at 257.
264. See id. at 258.
265. Id. at 257.
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